

OUTA

ORGANISATION UNDOING TAX ABUSE

14 October 2021

Holding onto power

How political parties have taken R13.879 billion from the fiscus since 2009

Compiled by:

Christopher Scholtz
Matt Johnston
Louise Flanagan
Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse

Contact:

christopher.scholtz@outa.co.za
087 170 0639



Holding onto power

A report on the public funding of political parties and the failure of constituency engagement

An OUTA report on how South Africa's Parliament and provincial legislatures fund political parties, how political parties have benefitted from R13.870 billion from the fiscus since 2009, the use of "constituency work" to justify this, the failure to account for the spending, and the prioritisation of party over public interest

14 October 2021

Contents

1. Executive summary	4
Public participation	4
Accountability	4
Money	4
2. Recommendations	6
2.1. Public participation	6
2.2. Accountability	6
2.3. Constituency work	6
2.4. Political party funding	7
3. Parliament and public participation	9
3.1. The deterioration of public engagement and parliamentary accountability	9
3.2. Parliament's institutional stagnation	10
3.3. Parliament's outdated mechanisms	15
3.4. The veneer of public participation	17
3.5. Civil society concerns	18
4. Constituency work	20
5. Public funding for political parties: 11 streams	23
5.1. The funding streams	23
5.2. Why is this funding a problem?	24
5.3. Public funding for political parties: Here are the numbers	26
5.4. A note on the numbers	29
6. Spending priorities	30
7. The legal framework and how this is used	33
7.1. The fund run by the Electoral Commission	33
7.2. Parliament and the legislatures	35
7.3. Parliament's funding	38
7.4. Support for democracy: fund the SABC instead	42
7.5. The provincial legislatures	43
8. Annexure A: The provincial laws and funds	46
8.1.1. Eastern Cape Legislature	46
8.1.2. Free State Legislature	47
8.1.3. Gauteng Legislature	49

8.1.4.	KwaZulu-Natal Legislature	50
8.1.5.	Limpopo Legislature	52
8.1.6.	Mpumalanga Legislature.....	53
8.1.7.	Northern Cape Legislature	54
8.1.8.	North West Legislature	56
8.1.9.	Western Cape Legislature.....	58
9.	Annexure B: 15 years of public funding for political parties 2009/10 to 2023/24.....	60

1. Executive summary

This report arose from three main concerns, which are inter-related.

Public participation

Firstly, that Parliament is slowly abandoning systemic and substantive public participation in its proceedings. In the public participation which remains, the public voice is too often invited but ultimately ignored. This increases the influence of party politics in parliamentary decisions at the expense of the public voice.

Accountability

Secondly, that Parliament displays an alarming lack of accountability to the public, including approving substantial funding through its own vote for political parties using the justification of supporting constituency offices – which should provide crucial links between parliamentarians and the voters – without confirmation that such offices function or even exist. This prioritises party interests above public interests, showing that Parliament regards itself as accountable to parties rather than the electorate.

Money

Thirdly, that Parliament has led the way in setting a national culture among the legislatures, propped up by constitutionally dubious provincial legislation, of providing vast amounts of public funding to represented political parties. This funding effectively entrenches those parties in power and disadvantages any new parties. The spreading out of this funding across 11 sources effectively hides the enormity of this support: R1.421 billion in the 2021/22 financial year alone, part of R13.882 billion over the 13 years from 2009/10 to 2021/22. The main publicly known stream of funding through the Represented Political Party Fund forms just 12% of this largely hidden support for parties; instead the bulk of the subsidy is from Parliament's own budget and from each of the nine provincial legislatures' budgets. There is no information available to the public on how this money is spent. In this way Parliament has prioritised the political parties of its Members over the concerns of the public, with Parliamentarians seeing themselves as accountable to their parties rather than the voters.

The above problems are inter-connected. The creation and entrenchment of such significant additional funding streams for political parties for which there is no accountability could only have been established through a Parliament which has little interest in public participation and even less interest in accounting to the public. Parliament's disengagement with the public has run parallel to the increased financial support for parties.

OUTA does not oppose all public funding for represented political parties. We support the existence of the Represented Political Party Fund. Rather, it is the extent of this funding, the hidden nature of the bulk of it and the implications for democracy that causes concern. Much of this funding became entrenched and protected by provincial laws around 2009, the start of the era of greatly extended state capture. We believe this should be viewed as an aspect of state capture.

Graphics

We have included graphics on the spending in this report. These are not intended as directions on where this money should be spent (although we would like to see some of these alternatives provided with better funding), but rather as comparisons to better explain the value of the funding being provided to political parties and the spending priorities of those public representatives who vote approval for budgets which include that spending.

2. Recommendations

These recommendations revolve around the requirement for transparency and accountability.

2.1. Public participation

- Parliament needs to strengthen systems encouraging input from the public.
- Digital tools are now more widely available and understood, and will save costs by offering remote access to public hearings. We recommend that Parliament makes use of such tools, for example, by establishing a platform for public comments through YouTube during a parliamentary plenary session, and by providing structured platforms through which constituents can hold their local MP to account.
- The supporting units in the core business division of Parliament should be augmented by permanent and clearly structured working relationships with external bodies and apolitical civil society organisations.

2.2. Accountability

- Parliament's Oversight and Accountability model and the Public Participation model should be re-tabled for inclusive scrutiny. This will create a real forum for constructive, apolitical debates on the operational model of Parliament as well as its strategic objectives. It will also create an opportunity for researchers and activists to invest their experience and knowledge into the self-reorganisation of parliamentary committees.

2.3. Constituency work

- There should be greater transparency in the work that MPs and Members of the NCOP do, with a platform for public commitments and public reporting on the work carried out during constituency periods, so MPs can be held to account by their constituencies.

- Parliament, the provincial legislatures and the political parties must provide lists of the parties' constituency offices and their addresses. This should be easily accessible on Parliament's website.
- Funding for constituency offices should be clear, and clearly used for this purpose only. The financial records of every single constituency office must be made public for purposes of transparency and accountability.
- Parliament should produce an annual report on constituency offices, describing how the funds allocated achieve value for money or any benefits for the public. This should be compiled in significant detail that enables grassroots communities to assess the performance and desirability of their own constituency office and give said communities the power and knowledge to make informed recommendations for changes to the relevant expenditure plans of Parliament.

2.4. Political party funding

- The reports which parties receiving funds were required to provide to Parliament and the legislatures must be made public by Parliament and those legislatures, dating from 2009/10.
- The annual reports on the various political party funds which the provinces set up must be made public, dating from when each of those funds was established. These reports should reflect the amounts credited to the funds both from legislatures and from any other sources (some of these funds allowed donations from other sources including international sources) and the amounts distributed to each party.
- Funding which parties fail to account for must be repaid, particularly going forward.
- Stop all future direct transfers to political parties through provincial political party funds. The only funding of this type which should remain is the funding of the Represented Political Party Fund through the Electoral Commission, which runs through the Home Affairs vote.
- There should be greater transparency in any funding which remains (eg for constituency offices). Parliament and the provincial legislatures should be able to fund the parties as outlined in the Constitution only: with financial and administrative assistance *“to enable the party and its leader to perform their functions in the Assembly [legislature]”*

*effectively*¹. Budgets and annual reports should clearly state the purpose for this funding, the indicators for measuring it (we would like to see a public process to help set these indicators) and the method of accounting for the spending, and make this information easily available to the public.

- The Political Party Funding Act of 2018 should be amended so that parties must report *all* sources of funding over the prescribed limit (currently R100 000 a year from a single source) to the Electoral Commission, and to require that *all* this must be reported on to the public.
- Parties should be required to provide tax compliance certificates before receiving any public funding.
- Parliament is currently transferring about R500 million a year directly to political parties with no public accounting for this spending. It would be more valuable support for democracy if this funding was direct to the SABC instead, to support the public broadcasting services which are crucial for democracy.

¹ Sections 57(2)(c) and 116(2)(c) of the Constitution.

3. Parliament and public participation

3.1. The deterioration of public engagement and parliamentary accountability

On 8 November 2012, the Heinrich Boll Foundation and others engaged with Parliament's Rules of the National Assembly Committee on public submissions for the review of the institution's Rules – and on how Extended Public Committees could meaningfully involve civil society in Parliamentary deliberations. It meant that the public could work as MPs on a specific subject of public interest. This was a noteworthy example of Parliament opening itself to real public engagement and meaningful interaction with civil society.

Extended Public Committees (EPCs) were set up as forums to alleviate the workload of Parliamentary committees and had the potential to enhance Parliament's ability to achieve its goals. However, Parliament changed the name of this forum to "mini-plenary" sessions since the advent of the new rules on 26 May 2016, 9th edition. This newly named forum was said to entail the same procedure and structure, but the quality of engagement deteriorated. Since then, civil society representatives were no longer ordinarily invited to take part in proceedings. We interpret this as a red flag in the gradual abandonment of systemic and substantive public participation in the proceedings of Parliament. This is a core problem that this report aims to address, by analysing information available on the public financing, political operation, and public experiences of constituency offices. We choose this method because, by Parliament's own indications, constituency engagement is one of the primary mechanisms through which issues on the ground are noted by parliamentarians and subsequently dealt with as part of the institution's core business.

The Sixth Parliament, like those that came before it, resolved to address this well-known challenge. A report issued by Xolisile Mgxaji, Committee Content Advisor to the Joint Committee on the Financial Management of Parliament, indicated that many constituency offices funded by the public and for the public are dysfunctional. In some cases, it is unclear whether these offices even exist or operate – but taxpayer money flows. This is the point of departure for OUTA's analysis.

Constituency offices are funded by Parliament which means that South African citizens are funding a system that does not work for them. This is the second noteworthy signifier of what we

see as abandonment of substantive and meaningful public participation in Parliament. It also suggests a serious lack of accountability for parliamentary spending more generally.

3.2.Parliament's institutional stagnation

During the Fourth Parliament's term (May 2009 – March 2014), Parliament established its independent assessment panel to assess whether it was meeting its constitutional obligations. By 15 March 2012, the Joint Rules committee agreed that the recommendations from the Independent Panel should be incorporated into Parliament's strategic plans. The National Assembly House Chairperson, Cedric Frolick, explained at the time that the recommendations were going to be implemented as projects of the strategic plan of the Fourth Parliament.

Further, a Task Team instituted by the Joint Rules Committee had been tasked with overseeing the implementation of a mechanism to scrutinise legislation. Crucially, one of the independent assessment Panel's recommendations was that Parliament should design and implement mechanisms which will translate constituency issues into committee agendas and oversight priorities. It was anticipated that the project would be completed by June 2012 and the new structure would be functional by April 2013. Two years later at the deadline for full functionality, in 2015, the committee indicated that due to insufficient time, the progress report by the Task Team on Public Participation would be deferred to the Fifth Parliament for finalisation.

In 2017, the High-Level Panel's Report on the Assessment of Key Legislation and Acceleration of Fundamental Change (Task Team) had been finalised and submitted to Parliament. This panel had been set up and tasked by the Executive arm of government. Quoting from its Executive Summary, *"evidence presented shows that the ills of the past are being reproduced in post-apartheid society, despite extensive legislative reform"*. It goes on to say that *"in some instances, the legislative interventions recommended by the Panel are specific and urgent, to address urgent societal problems, or because the Panel has identified problems with Bills that are currently before Parliament."*

This clearly suggests that the content of this extremely important and highly credible report, by way of example, warranted immediate and prompt attention and implementation by Presiding and ordinary Members of Parliament. Yet, such attention and implementation has not been forthcoming. Several recommendations and observations made in this substantive report echo what internal assessments in Parliament had found and called for already. It indicates that the

edifice of Parliament is either unwilling or incapable of changing its ways in line with authoritative recommendations.

The High-Level Panel Report goes on to say that *“Effective Parliamentary oversight is dependent on Members of Parliament acting in the best interests of the people of South Africa without fear, favour, or prejudice. At the heart of whether government delivers on its Constitutional mandate, and whether Parliament legislates to bring about change and exercises oversight effectively, are issues of accountability. The Panel [proposed] ways to deepen the relationship between constituencies and their representatives to assure more direct accountability to the public.”*

Over and above internal observations made by senior Members of Parliament regarding the institution’s failure to facilitate and provide an example of accountability, OUTA and many other civil and political organisations have made similar observations to no effect. On 22 June 2017, the Constitutional Court handed down its “secret ballot” judgment in the case of *United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly, 2017 (5) SA 300 (CC)*. Speaking on behalf of the Court, the Chief Justice held, inter alia, that *“Members [of Parliament] are required to swear or affirm faithfulness to the Republic and obedience to the Constitution and laws. Nowhere does the supreme law provide for them to swear allegiance to their political parties, important players though they are in our constitutional scheme. Meaning in the event of conflict between upholding constitutional values and party loyalty, their irrevocable undertaking to in effect serve the people and do only what is in their best interest must prevail. This is so, not only because they were elected through their parties to represent the people, but also to enable the people to govern through them, in terms of the Constitution.”*

We contend that this conflict between upholding constitutional values and party loyalty occurs in Parliamentary committees daily. We further argue that this imperative that says party political representatives must, as their absolute and unfaltering priority, enable people to govern through them is not being realised. Staff in OUTA’s Parliamentary Engagement Office have personally witnessed countless instances of party-political decision making, both within and outside of formal parliamentary forums, that in no shape or form prioritise the public interest. On the contrary, we have witnessed decision making that knowingly or negligently contradicts the explicit best interests of the public at large – but effectively serves party political purposes over the short, medium and, especially, long terms.

We must consider the potential impact and implications of the more recent Constitutional Court case that directly speaks to our prevailing constituency system. In *New Nation Movement NPC*

and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, the majority ruling stated that “*The entrenchment of proportional representation, and its achievement through the vehicle of political parties, flows from the prioritisation of equality in political voice (every vote counts equally) over the accountability that might be better secure through a constituency-based system or a mixed system.*”

The new kind of a representation system that may flow from the Constitutional Court’s order that independent candidates must be allowed to stand in provincial and national elections is beyond the scope of this report. Nonetheless, it is our conviction that the political machinery that prevails is such that the Executive simply is not held accountable by Parliament; and it is such that Parliament is not accountable to the people – but rather to political parties. This directly contradicts the principle of government by the people and for the people enshrined in the Constitution. Again, this observation is not entirely new – and has been articulated in crucial works such as the High-Level Panel’s Report on Assessment of Key Legislation and the Acceleration of Fundamental Change.

Parliament’s Joint Rules Committee established a subcommittee to consider how Parliament should process the High-Level Panel’s report and its recommendations. Recommendations were referred to the relevant Portfolio and Select Committees, which had to report by 28 September 2018 whether the recommendations referred to them could be processed in the short, medium, or long term. Another report was finalised on 24 October 2018, but again, implementation was ultimately deferred to the Sixth Parliament. In Table 1 below, we refer to and comment on a sample of important reports that, to date, have practically speaking come to naught.

Reports	Content & Notes
Legacy Report – Performance of the Fifth Parliament	<p>Since the Joint Standing Committee on Financial Management of Parliament (JSCFMP) has been tasked with developing a method for overseeing Parliament’s financial management in May 2016, its recommendations have had little impact and have been responded to poorly. It remains a challenge for the committee to measure the institution’s real performance, as most sub-programmes are not measured and are poorly developed.</p> <p>The Sixth Parliament had to develop an appropriate monitoring system to assess constituency office performance. This has not yet been provided. This is a critical omission.</p>

<p>Parliamentary Oversight Authority (POA) Report</p>	<p>The JSCFMP of the Sixth Parliament should accommodate all outstanding matters relating to the POA in its programme. The JSCFMP’s research team should advise on how outstanding matters related to the work of the POA could be incorporated in the new committee’s programme and method of work, and whether it would be advisable to establish a sub-committee to focus entirely on what had previously been handled by the POA.²</p> <p>Comment: Throughout the Fifth Parliament, power and authority was often used at the expense of oversight performance.</p> <p>OUTA recommends effective and impartial think tanks to be established in building balanced partnerships between MPs, the public, and Parliamentary support staff (researchers and content advisors). This could greatly contribute to general capacity building as well as the monitoring and evaluation tools needed to track the effectiveness of Parliamentary oversight in real time.</p>
<p>Parliament’s performance in the 4th Quarter of 2019/20</p>	<p>Parliament’s own Oversight and Accountability Model provides for the public to openly judge the performance of government accountability, transparency, and fairness, but this age-old provision has not been implemented. The fourth quarter performance report of Parliament specified that few citizens were interested in the business of Parliament. Although the YouTube and Facebook platforms are being embraced due to Covid-19 physical restrictions, Parliament has failed to ensure government by the people and for the people. The following section illustrates to what extent Parliament’s budget has favoured the enfranchisement and capacitation of individual Members of Parliament – rather than the empowerment of grassroots communities and ordinary people on the ground.</p>
<p>Policy Priorities for the 6th Parliament on Constituency Work</p>	<p>Members alluded to the importance of constituency work. However, the oversight work performed by individual Members in constituencies is detached from committee and plenary agendas. According to their mandates, Members must perform oversight activities in their constituencies, and relay submissions, concerns, and petitions to the committee system, thereby linking matters of public interest to the core business of Parliament. Such matters could then be included in, or form part of, recommendations tabled for adoption in the relevant House.</p> <p>Comment: During some planning sessions Members proposed that the petition system must be improved. In this regard, some Provincial Legislatures enacted petition laws to strengthen such processes. Providing an effective means for the public to petition Parliament will assist in building a culture of responsiveness and accountability – which forms a key part of the institution’s constitutional mandate. The translation of issues on the ground into committee agendas is not clear. This needs improvement.</p>
<p>Joint Standing Committee on Financial Management of Parliament (JSCFMP)</p>	<p>The Acting Secretary of Parliamentary briefed the JSCFMP on 12 May 2020 and a question was asked about how Parliament is going to assist MPs with their constituency work as constituency offices are an extension of Parliament.</p>

² Parliament. Announcements, Tablings and Committee Reports (ATC) no 51 of 2013.

	<p>The Acting Secretary answered that division managers have agreed that such issues should be raised at a political level because many in the public space do not know what a public constituency office (PCO) does. As the administration of Parliament, this would be presented to both House Chairpersons to find a way forward on this matter. On constituency work, it was stated that Members need to find time and acquire better information through improved management of the wide range of public submission that Parliament receives regularly. It was stated that, for example, results-based management and balanced score cards should be used more effectively.</p> <p>Masibulele Xaso, Secretary to the National Assembly, stipulated that the matter of coordinating oversight is being addressed. During the Covid-19 pandemic, committees of the two Houses (National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces) had been hosting joint meetings. At the time, they were in a process of looking at the programme of Parliament to see how it could create more space for committees to conduct their oversight and constituency work. He said that work is in progress and in due course it would be made available to Members. Regarding the study that had been done by the Chief Whips and the recommendations that came from that study, an implementation plan had been established to ensure that all the issues that were raised that had not been yet implemented are also receiving attention.</p>
	<p>Comment: The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic showcased the internal challenges Parliament continues to face. It also created a new desire in the public domain for Parliament to become effective and stop wasting money on programmes that do not achieve their objectives. We are yet to see whether the priorities for the Sixth Parliament to address issues raised in the Fifth Term Legacy Reports, JSCFMP reports, State Capture investigations, and outstanding complaints with the Joint Standing Committee on Ethics and Members' Interests will be implemented. More on this topic in the chapters that follow.</p>
<p>2013 Draft Participation Framework</p>	<p>The purpose of the Public Participation Framework seeks to move the legislature sector to involvement within the levels of participation. Public participation is two-way communication and collaborative problem-solving mechanism with the goal of achieving better and more consensual decisions.</p>
	<p>Comment: This report has gone nowhere in Parliament. We strongly recommend inclusive deliberations as soon as possible.</p>
<p>Global Parliamentary Report 2017: Parliamentary Oversight</p>	<p>The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) conducted a study which was a compendium of Parliamentary practice as it applies to oversight. The IPU study's findings highlight the following challenges facing MPs around the world:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. MPs do not foster a collaborative culture of oversight; b. Parliaments are still struggling to ensure that inputs received through public participation activities are channelled to appropriate committees; and

	<p>c. A core challenge for effective and authentic oversight is the inability of MPs to think independently and express politically unpopular views in the performance of their duties.</p>
	<p>Comment: Parliament has proven incapable or unwilling to develop meaningful indicators of MPs' performance or to us technological innovation that could better connect the public to parliamentary proceedings than the current Oversight and Accountability and Constituency Models.</p>

3.3.Parliament’s outdated mechanisms

Section 57 of the Constitution provides that “(1) *The National Assembly may (a) determine and control its internal arrangements, proceedings and procedures*” and National Assembly Rule 167 states the following: “*For the purposes of performing its functions a committee may, subject to the Constitution, legislation, the other provisions of these rules and resolutions of the Assembly ... (f) determine its own working arrangements.* Similarly, National Council of Provinces Rule 103 provides for the general powers of its committees. It states that “(1) *For the purposes of performing its functions a committee may, subject to the Constitution, legislation, the other provisions of these Rules and resolutions of the Council ... (e) determine its own procedure.*”

We contend that the interpretive discretion afforded to Members of the Legislature by Section 57 of the Constitution is subject to exploitation and strategic limitation of practical accountability mechanisms. Problematically, there is no clear recourse for civil society or any public agent who unpopularly sees any of the internal rules and mechanisms of oversight in Parliament, pursuant to Executive accountability, as inadequate. These rules forbid certain actions while *requiring few* and authorising many. Members of Parliament are free to act in the immense zone of the “permissible but not required” without constitutional constraint.

There are several mainstream mechanisms that are supposed to relate the deliberations of parliamentary committees with matters of public interest and thereby inform oversight practices. Some examples are provided below.

- 1) **Submissions** to a Committee of Parliament. This is ordinarily only in response to an advertised call for public comment on a specific Bill or matter of public interest as and when this is deemed necessary by the relevant Chairperson. A submission to Parliament may or may not be considered in the final decision making of the relevant committee. In general, its

contents would be noted in a report produced by support staff of the committee after its deliberations or public hearing. In our experience of making submissions and delivering presentations during public hearings, recommendations are rarely echoed by the relevant committee in their report – and there is a lack of follow through in the Executive or consequences for non-implementation.

- 2) **Petitions** to Parliament. Section 56 (d) and 69 (d) of the Constitution provides for the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces to receive petitions, representations or submissions from any interested persons or institutions. A petition is a formal request to an authority for action. It can assume the form of either a demand, a request for a favour or the redress of a grievance. The way petitions are processed in Parliament is not transparent and a petition to Parliament does not guarantee that the desired impact will result. The petitions process is complex, and finding solutions to common problems takes too long to bring change in communities. Reforms are needed to reinforce the role of public representatives and improve public understanding of what MPs do, inside and outside Parliament.

- 3) **Attend** Committee meetings and engage Members of Parliament. This avenue is cumbersome and unpopular since the parliamentary precinct is not easily accessible and it is located far away from most South Africans. However, electronic connections between citizens and MPs can contribute towards a solution. Parliamentary dynamics operate as follows:
 - i. **Whips:** Members give feedback to and are directed by their whips. Whips are party-political functionaries. A whip is a member selected by his or her party to assist keeping members informed of party and parliamentary business and ensuring that members deliver on their duties and toe the party-political line.
 - ii. **Portfolio, Standing, Joint and Select Committees:** MPs deliberate on Bills covering government departments area of jurisdiction, scrutinise departments' annual performance plans and strategic plans, make recommendations, produce committee reports and debate these reports in the House (National Assembly), then the House may adopt the committees' recommendations or refer these back to the committees for further work. As part of their Executive oversight work, committees may also carry out site visits where they find out directly from the people at ground level whether the government is delivering on its promises.
 - iii. **Members' Statement:** The opportunity for members' statements was created mainly to give Members of Parliament an opportunity to raise constituency

concerns in the House. Furthermore, if there is a burning issue of grave importance that a Member (usually of the Opposition) wants the House to discuss as soon as possible, he or she may request the Speaker to agree to accommodate a debate on a matter of public importance.

- 4) **Online platforms e.g. People's Assembly:** The People's Assembly website aims to promote accountability and bridge the gap between ordinary people and their elected representatives. This platform promotes a greater public voice and enhances public participation in politics by providing information about our elected representatives and the institutions they serve, and even allows you, the citizen, to provide feedback. However, this organisation is an NGO, not a functionary of the South African government. It is an independent initiative which is not funded by Parliament.

It is our view that the actions of the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces do not satisfy the constitutional provision that states they must *ensure* mechanisms that effect accountability and oversight of the Executive in line with lived realities on the ground. Political interests and bias in the interpretation and application of their powers limit their effectiveness. We have noted a lack of impact or real consequences in accountability.

3.4. The veneer of public participation

While Parliament routinely runs official public participation processes on various policies and bills, there is little to prevent these processes from being merely window dressing.

For example, the Administrative Adjudication of Road Traffic Offences Amendment Act (AARTO) received significant public comment, much of it extremely critical. However, very little of this appears to be reflected in the final act.

There is little point in running public comment processes if the comments are routinely read and then ignored.

Public participation is crucial for good governance. In November 2020, OUTA reported on the reduction of public participation and the resultant weakening of parliamentary oversight.³

3.5.Civil society concerns

The Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse hosted a webinar session on 12 October 2020 and invited researchers and project leaders from a range of civil society organisations such as the Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG), Parliament Watch, My Vote Counts and Southern African Faith Communities' Environment Institute (SAFCEI).

The session started with a presentation by OUTA, on parliamentary oversight review. The presentation focused on various perspectives on Parliament's role in oversight and why civil society be involved in public oversight. We observed that there are no decent follow-ups from committees, notably on recommendations made in reports. Instead, questionable behaviours of politicians are reinforced by the reward of higher positions such as committee chairpersonships or ministerial office. On the other hand, we see that committee activity has increased and appreciate the efforts from the MPs despite hard impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic. Yet, the question is whether the busyness equals effectiveness.

One civil society representative commented that monitoring reports released by committees over the years contain a lot of copy-and-paste from previous iterations – detracting from the relevance and authenticity of these reports. Timeframes around the Budget Review and Recommendations Reports (BRRRs) process are getting more unrealistic and cumbersome, further detracting from the impact of that process. During 2020 there were near zero annual reports submitted on time and 2021 has not been much better. What alternative sources of information for parliamentary oversight are there for committees beside government departments and entities? Members can make use of civil society knowledge to make independent conclusions on the performance of state organs. Nevertheless, it seems that committees do not use these mechanisms.

There is a very limited understanding among ordinary citizens about how Parliament works and how they can participate in its operations. Civil society and the public, in general, are supposed to have access to parliamentary information and should be able to engage. Usually, both

³ November 2020. OUTA. MPs asleep at the wheel: OUTA 2020 report on Parliamentary Oversight in South Africa. The full report is online here <https://outa.co.za/web/content/151086> and a summary is here <https://outa.co.za/web/content/151087>

individual MPs and committees can put forward legislation. However, it is not ordinary and does not happen often. When organised civil society does engage with Parliament, tangible impacts are unlikely to result from this.

The discussion on constituency engagement focused on constituency offices, their failure to function and Parliament's failure to address this. It is a common notion that Members of Parliament should interact with citizens and provide support through their constituency offices, yet a large part of the public is still unaware of what these offices do and how to use them to their advantage if and when possible. The problem is that Parliament's participation mechanisms are old and forgotten. The current structures take too long for public matters to be considered by committees. We have found that it takes Parliament years to translate constituency issues into committee agendas and oversight priorities.

Parliament makes money available to run these offices though no information is made public on how these finances are benefiting the public or how these offices reach their objectives. Parliament's budget is also not clear on how this money is spent on constituency offices or what it has been used for. Online platforms such as Parliament's website fail to display any coherent information about constituency offices. The negative impact of the Covid-19 pandemic has forced parliament to improve its communication to connect the public to parliamentary proceedings though it still does not advance any citizen matters.

4. Constituency work

Constituency engagement is one of the primary mechanisms through which issues on the ground are brought to the attention of MPs and NCOP delegates.

Constituencies and those who live in them should have meaningful opportunities to judge and influence the activity of parliamentary committees.

Although South Africa does not have a constituency based electoral system as national and provincial level, MPs are supposed to be assigned to constituencies around the country. In theory, almost every MP represents the interests of his or her specific constituency in Parliament. For example, there may be a serious problem, say with water provision, which falls under the purview of a national department or state-owned enterprise, which active constituents should be able raise with their local MP to get it resolved. Yet this does not generally happen in South Africa. At the same time, the HSRC's 2017 survey indicated that overall public trust in Parliament has decreased in 2017. Functional constituency offices would help enhance public trust in government.

Parliament builds time for constituency work into its schedule, so MPs and NCOP Members are paid to do this work.

In Parliament, Mondays are permanently dedicated to constituency work. In addition, there are lengthy breaks each year for constituency work.

We want MPs to account for their time and the public funds spent on their "constituency work". Without any accountability, it is difficult to understand why MPs earning more than R1.1 million a year take 10 weeks of leave at a stretch for "constituency work" but do not have to report back on this.

Now that remote working and networked meetings are being used, the system has changed to a more hybrid one which may involve both constituency work and committee work in the same day, which has advantages but also makes it harder to track constituency work.

The People's Assembly, an NGO involved in work on Parliament, explains constituency work as linking MPs to the public. "The purpose of constituency periods is to encourage MPs to remain in contact with the people they represent," says the People's Assembly. "MPs use constituency periods to attend to the public and work to solve problems in the communities where MPs are assigned constituents or assist with access to basic services such as social grants, housing and

health care. MPs also use constituency periods to report back to their constituents on what is happening in Parliament.”


Constituency offices are places funded by taxpayers (from SARS to National Treasury to Parliament to political parties) that are supposed to facilitate public interactions with MPs.

Although Parliament and the provincial legislatures provide funding for these offices, the funding runs directly to the parties. This means the constituency offices are not structures of Parliament, but run (where they exist) by the individual parties, as assets for those parties.

As mentioned higher up in this report, in 2016 the Joint Standing Committee on the Financial Management of Parliament was tasked with developing a system to assess constituency office performance, but this has not been done.

OUTA has been unable to obtain a list of the constituency offices funded by Parliament and their addresses, although this is the sort of information which should be easily publicly accessible.

Parliament’s website contains little about constituency offices or their performance. It does not include a list of offices or addresses. Below is what is supposed to be Parliament’s webpage on constituency work: nothing there.



Oops!

This is a little embarrassing. The page you're looking for doesn't exist.

You can also report the problem on this page.

In October 2020, OUTA asked Parliament and the parties' Chief Whips for constituency office details but received no help from Parliament and only sample lists from the ACDP, AIC, FF Plus, UDM, Good, AL Jamah-ah, and IFP. Lists from the ANC, DA and EFF have not been forthcoming. One of the smaller parties, AL Jamah-ah, said there was no monitoring by Parliament of the spending or their constituency offices.

This means Parliament is handing over with large amounts to parties, much of it to fund constituency offices, but makes no effort to confirm that these offices exist and function.

If Parliament hopes to gain the trust of the people and improve the services culture, it should have been able to provide the list and promote the constituency system, but Parliament's feedback is one of its weakest areas.

Provincial legislatures also use the justification of constituency work and constituency offices for funding parties. This means those legislatures should also have made such information easily available to the public. We could not find online provincial lists of these constituency offices.

This problem is not helped by the lack of a national constituency map.

The People's Assembly lists MPs on its website⁴ and, as far it has been able, constituency offices. However, the information is inadequate: for example, the ANC has 304 constituency offices named, but only 15 have an address and very few have an MP's name listed. It wasn't possible to track the constituency offices for the DA or EFF by party; there may have been individual offices listed but the geographical area was needed to find them.

⁴ www.pa.org.za

5. Public funding for political parties: 11 streams

5.1. The funding streams

OUTA has identified 11 funding streams from public funds for represented political parties.

These are the Represented Political Party Fund, funds from Parliament's own vote, and funds from each of the nine provincial legislature votes. Details of the funding follow in graphics below.

The Electoral Commission fund wasn't enough for parties

The Represented Political Party Fund (RPP Fund) received R166.812 million in 2021/22, to share between all parties represented at national and provincial level.

But those representatives believed this wasn't enough, so Parliament and the provincial legislatures added more from their funds, taking that year's total to R1 420.743 million (that's R1.421 billion).

The total the parties took home in 2021/22 is thus **8 times** the RPP Fund allocation.

The Represented Political Party Fund

The most well-known channel for funding of represented political parties is the RPP Fund, which is managed by the Electoral Commission. This is funded through the Home Affairs vote (which funds the Electoral Commission). Although this is presented as the main funding for parties, this fund has in the last 13 years accounted for only about 12% of the total public funding for parties.

Parliament

Parliament funds represented political parties directly from its own budget.

The amounts are enormous:

In 2021/22, Parliament transferred R489 959 000 (R490 million) directly to political parties. This is in addition to other support to Members, such as travel.

The total amount transferred by Parliament to parties in the 13 years from 2009/10 to 2021/22 is R4 865 446 380 (R4.866 billion).

The parties are represented by 400 MPs and 90 National Council of Provinces (NCOP) Members, a total of 490 members. That R490 million is thus the equivalent of about R1 million per Member for 2021/22, and the last 13 years have cost South Africa about R9.9 million per Member. Although

this support doesn't go to the Members themselves (they are prohibited from this), it goes to their parties to keep those seats.

The provinces

All nine provinces fund represented political parties through their legislature budgets.

Again, funding is substantial.

Below is the provincial funding for the current financial year.

Direct transfers to political parties	
Legislature	2021/22
Eastern Cape	R120.072m
Free State	R40.295m
Gauteng	R150.921m
KwaZulu-Natal	R119.560m
Limpopo	R125.000m
Mpumalanga	R56.162m
Northern Cape	R47.476m
North West	R54.573m
Western Cape	R49.913m
TOTAL	R763.972m

5.2. Why is this funding a problem?

OUTA does not oppose all public funding for represented political parties. We support the existence of the Represented Political Party Fund. Rather, it is the extent of this funding, the hidden nature of the bulk of it and the implications for democracy that causes concern.

If parties already holding seats in Parliament and legislatures are able to vote themselves increasingly large sums of public funds, with no public accounting for it, this enables them to use it to entrench their hold on power. How could new parties with no public resources take on giants with such massive public funding? The Constitution intends state funding to enhance multi-party democracy, but the manipulation of huge amounts of additional funding by the very institutions required to safeguard democracy – the national Parliament and the provincial legislatures – effectively undermines the election of candidates from new parties.

There are also concerns over the fact that some of the provincial funds allow donations from funders outside the legislatures, with funds in Free State and Gauteng also allowing international donations. These are funds which are not declared in public and give rise to concerns over buying influence in parties.

We believe that far greater transparency is needed in this funding, to enable the public – and non-represented political parties – to understand how much money is going to the represented political parties and why. The current funding situation enables parties to hide not only how much money they receive from the public purse, but also how they spend it. This raises concern over the use of public funds to influence voting at party conferences or even in elections.

Under this system, the funding emphasis has emphasised support for the parties over servicing the public representatives' constituents.

Much of this funding became entrenched and protected by provincial laws around 2009, the start of the era of greatly extended state capture. We believe this should be viewed as an aspect of state capture.

Furthermore, the enormity of the public funding for parties raises questions of how a major party such as the ANC could take this funding every year – and Parliament and the legislatures continue to deliver it – while the party fails to honour its tax commitments to SARS by reportedly failing to hand over employee PAYE deductions. In the same way that government contractors are required to provide tax clearance certificates, parties should be required to provide tax compliance certificates before receiving public funding.

5.3. Public funding for political parties: Here are the numbers

Below are the amounts transferred to political parties from all 11 funding streams.

A more detailed breakdown of annual amounts is available in Annexure B at the end of this report.

TOTAL all funding streams		
2009/10 - 2021/22	Transfers to date (13 years)	13 882 191 326
2022/23 - 2023/24	Transfers next 2 years	2 890 514 000
2009/10 - 2023/24	Total transfers 15 years	16 772 705 326

Represented Political Party Fund		
Home Affairs vote transfer to Electoral Commission for distribution to parties		
2009/10 - 2021/22	Transfers to date (13 years)	1 681 445 000
2022/23 - 2023/24	Transfers next 2 years	342 688 000
2009/10 - 2023/24	Total transfers 15 years	2 024 133 000

Parliament's funding		
Total over 15 years per subprogramme		
2009/10 - 2021/22	Transfers to date (13 years)	4 865 446 380
2022/23 - 2023/24	Transfers next 2 years	1 007 600 000
2009/10 - 2023/24	Total transfers 15 years	5 873 046 380

Eastern Cape Legislature funding		
2009/10 - 2021/22	Transfers to date (13 years)	1 300 854 000
2022/23 - 2023/24	Transfers next 2 years	231 308 000
2009/10 - 2023/24	Total transfers 15 years	1 532 162 000

Free State Legislature funding		
2009/10 - 2021/22	Transfers to date (13 years)	678 841 946
2022/23 - 2023/24	Transfers next 2 years	66 791 000
2009/10 - 2023/24	Total transfers 15 years	745 632 946

Gauteng Legislature funding		
2009/10 - 2021/22	Transfers to date (13 years)	1 256 501 000
2022/23 - 2023/24	Transfers next 2 years	320 359 000
2009/10 - 2023/24	Total transfers 15 years	1 576 860 000

KwaZulu-Natal Legislature funding		
2009/10 - 2021/22	Transfers to date (13 years)	1 209 711 000
2022/23 - 2023/24	Transfers next 2 years	256 058 000
2009/10 - 2023/24	Total transfers 15 years	1 465 769 000

Limpopo Legislature funding		
2009/10 - 2021/22	Transfers to date 13 years)	1 021 258 000
2022/23 - 2023/24	Transfers next 2 years	268 000 000
2009/10 - 2023/24	Total transfers 15 years	1 289 258 000

Mpumalanga Legislature funding		
2009/10 - 2021/22	Transfers to date (13 years)	544 379 000
2022/23 - 2023/24	Transfers next 2 years	97 688 000
2009/10 - 2023/24	Total transfers 15 years	642 067 000

Northern Cape Legislature funding		
2009/10 - 2021/22	Transfers to date (13 years)	394 336 000
2022/23 - 2023/24	Transfers next 2 years	78 406 000
2009/10 - 2023/24	Total transfers 15 years	472 742 000

North West Legislature funding		
2009/10 - 2021/22	Transfers to date (13 years)	463 366 000
2022/23 - 2023/24	Transfers next 2 years	117 131 000
2009/10 - 2023/24	Total transfers 15 years	580 497 000

Western Cape Provincial Parliament funding		
2009/10 - 2021/22	Transfers to date (13 years)	466 053 000
2022/23 - 2023/24	Transfers next 2 years	104 485 000
2009/10 - 2023/24	Total transfers 15 years	570 538 000


Public funding for political parties

This is how much of taxpayers' funds have been used to fund political parties with seats in Parliament and provincial legislatures

2009/10 to 2021/22 (13 years): **R13.882 billion**
2022/23 to 2023/24 (next 2 years): **R2.891 billion**
Total for 15 years: **R16.773 billion**

2009/10 to 2021/22

This is where the **R13.882 billion** already paid came from:



Graph is indicative only, not to scale

5.4. A note on the numbers

The programme spending statistics were compiled from National Treasury budget documents (national and provincial budgets) and from annual reports of Parliament, the provincial legislatures and the Represented Political Party Fund.

There were sometimes conflicts between the numbers; we gave priority to Treasury numbers when they were available, and the most recent numbers available.

The amounts listed are the amounts which left government accounts. In some cases, amounts may have been deducted by fund managers for administration costs (for example, the Electoral Commission takes certain costs from the Represented Political Party Fund) but other amounts may have been added (such as interest payments or investment revenue).

Sometimes these documents had to be read in tandem to get a better picture of the spending. In the annual reports, the information was often only in the footnotes to the financial statements.

Most government spending is listed in two ways: by programme, and by spending type. In many cases we were able to connect these. For example, Parliament's spending on political parties runs through the Associated Services programme, and a portion of the spending in this particular programme is listed as transfers to non-profit institutions: this is the funding which is transferred directly to the parties. These direct transfers in all the spending streams are, as far as possible, the spending which this report focuses on. Thus additional support for the parties, which is paid by Parliament or the legislatures, such as travel or accommodation, is not included in this report.

In addition, it is worth remembering that Members of Parliament are provided with various additional perks, including up to 88 flights per year per MP. A list of perks for the 6th Parliament is [here](#).


We were unable to calculate how much each party received, as in most cases this information was not reported in either budgets or annual reports. Where it was reported, only historical figures were available. This is unacceptable: it is public funding and the public is entitled to know where it is going and how it is being spent.

6. Spending priorities

It is often difficult to understand the value of large amounts of money, particularly when government spending is measured in hundreds of millions or even billions of rand.

We compiled some comparisons to illustrate the enormity of the funding for the political parties, and the attitudes towards budgeting choices it reveals.

POLITICAL PARTIES VS DRINKING WATER



(Source: Gift of Givers spent R350 000 to R600 000 drilling boreholes in drought-stricken Ngqushwa Local Municipality in the Eastern Cape in November 2020)

OUTA
ORGANISATION UNDOING TAX ABUSE

POLITICAL PARTIES VS FIXING HOSPITALS

One year: 2019/20




293 hospitals upgraded (rehabilitation, renovations, refurbishment, upgrades & additions)

Spending on political parties = 84% of spending on upgrading 293 hospitals

(Source: Reply to Parliament RCW459 of 29 March 2021)

OUTA
ORGANISATION UNDOING TAX ABUSE

POLITICAL PARTIES VS WATER & SANITATION



(Source: National Treasury budgets, last year of actual spending on Water & Sanitation infrastructure available)

OUTA
ORGANISATION UNDOING TAX ABUSE

POLITICAL PARTIES VS HELP FOR LOOTED BUSINESSES

One year: 2021/22



(Source: Second Special Appropriation Bill 2021)

OUTA
ORGANISATION UNDOING TAX ABUSE

7. The legal framework and how this is used

The **Constitution** requires national legislation to provide for the funding of political parties participating in national and provincial legislatures (section 236 of the Constitution) (**see box**). In terms of this, the national law for public funding of represented political parties was passed, and replaced with an updated law in 2018. However, most of the provincial legislatures have also passed their own funding legislation, despite the constitutional requirement for this to be national legislation.

7.1. The fund run by the Electoral Commission

In 1997, the **Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Act** (PFRPPA) was passed to fulfil the constitutional requirement for funding represented political parties, and expressly refers to this requirement in the Constitution. This act established the **Represented Political Parties' Fund**. This was repealed in January 2019 and replaced with the **Political Party Funding Act** no 6 of 2018 (PPFA), which came into full effect on 1 April 2021; this act retained the fund but slightly renamed it as the **Represented Political Party Fund** plus added the **Multi-Party Democracy Fund** (for shared funding of represented parties from private sources).

The RPP Fund is the most well-known public funding for represented political parties.

The RPP Fund is managed by the Electoral Commission and is funded through the Home Affairs vote. The Home Affairs vote explains this sub-programme: "*Represented Political Parties' Fund* transfers funds to the Represented Political Parties' Fund to provide funding

The Constitution

Section 236: Funding for political parties

To enhance multi-party democracy, national legislation must provide for the funding of political parties participating in national and provincial legislatures on an equitable and proportional basis.

The Electoral Commission funds

The Political Party Funding Act of 2018 sets up two funds, both managed by the Electoral Commission:

1. Represented Political Party Fund (funded through the Home Affairs vote).
2. Multi-Party Democracy Fund (with donations from private sources, shared among all parties).

for political parties participating in Parliament and provincial legislatures”. This thus includes parties represented in the provincial legislatures.

The Electoral Commission pays the parties from the fund and publishes their reports on moneys received and other donations to the parties disclosed to the Commission.

The PPFA prohibits certain sources of funding and further regulates disclosure of donations. Under the 2018 law, neither the RPP Fund nor political parties may accept money from any organ of state, state-owned enterprise or foreign government or foreign government agency. Parties must also disclose to the Commission all donations received above the prescribed threshold (currently R100 000 per source per year), and that the Commission must publish the donations disclosed to it. This law also bars parties from receiving more than R15 million from a single donor in one year.

The Commission announced⁵ its first report⁶ under this law on 9 September 2021.

The funding from Parliament or the provincial legislatures is not included.

While this act allows Parliament and the legislatures a certain leeway with funding, we believe that the size of that funding is far more than intended by the Constitution and Financial Management of Parliament Act allow (for more on this, see the next section).

As Parliament and the legislatures have demonstrated for years, this is a legal loophole big enough to drive hundreds of millions of rand through every year.

⁵ 9 September 2021. Electoral Commission. Electoral Commission issues 2021/22 first quarter disclosure report in terms of the Political Party Funding Act and Regulations. Available online here: <https://www.elections.org.za/pw/News-And-Media/News-List/News/News-Article/Electoral-Commission-issues-2021-22-first-quarter-disclosure-report-in-terms-of-the-Political-Party-Funding-Act-and-Regulations?a=AlSDGvpz75ps1usOfX7oin7Pjc24UeU6Jvc1FWuTafg=>

⁶ 9 September 2021. Electoral Commission. Published Declarations Report. Available online here: https://www.elections.org.za/content/PartyFundingReports/4/1/4_1_Published_Declarations_Report.pdf

7.2. Parliament and the legislatures

The PPFA says that Parliament and provincial legislatures may not fund parties other than through the PPFA (the RPP Fund) (**see box below**), sections 57(2) and 116(2) of the Constitution which enables the parties to perform their functions in Parliament or the legislatures effectively (**see box**), or section 34 of the Financial Management of Parliament Act (FMPA)⁷ (**see large box** at end of this section below).

The PPFA blocks funding by organs of state and state-owned enterprises, but Parliament and legislatures are neither.

Parliament and legislatures are legally able to fund parties to enable them “to perform their functions” in those legislatures.

However, there is no indication of what “to perform their functions” in Parliament or the legislatures “effectively” means or the amount of funding deemed reasonable; but this appears to have been interpreted very widely in favour of entrenching the parties in power at the expense of the public purse.

The amount of the funding being passed on to the parties indicates significant abuse of this process. Furthermore, there is little to none of the legally required monitoring of how these funds are spent.

The Constitution

Section 57(2)(c)

57. Internal arrangements, proceedings and procedures of National Assembly

2. The rules and orders of the National Assembly must provide for ...

c. financial and administrative assistance to each party represented in the Assembly in proportion to its representation, to enable the party and its leader to perform their functions in the Assembly effectively;

116(2)(c)

116. Internal arrangements, proceedings and procedures of provincial legislatures

2. The rules and orders of a provincial legislature must provide for ...

c. financial and administrative assistance to each party represented in the legislature, in proportion to its representation, to enable the party and its leader to perform their functions in the legislature effectively...

⁷ The Financial Management of Parliament Act (the name changed during an amendment) no 10 of 2009, available online here: <https://www.oua.co.za/web/content/201533>

The original Financial Management of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act no 10 of 2009 is available online here: <https://www.oua.co.za/web/content/201529>

The FMPA requires that regulations “must” be made concerning the allocation and use of “any funds” provided by Parliament to political parties or MPs.

OUTA was unable to find a copy of such regulations and it appears that they were never issued.

This raises questions over the legality of all the payments by Parliament to the political parties, for years.

These transfers to parties should also be legalised through the various annual Appropriation Acts. Crucially, Parliament’s vote entry in the annual Estimates of National Expenditure excludes all the detail of spending on programmes which is standard in other votes. This effectively conceals the funding to parties. It also raises questions about the legality of these transfers. In 2021/22, Parliament’s budget was R2.144 billion after Members’ salaries are paid, but provided less than a page

of information on how this is to be spent⁸. There is a hint: R490 million is listed as “transfers and subsidies” under “Associated Services”, which is the money paid directly to political parties. We used the Treasury’s budget spreadsheets and Parliament’s annual reports to track Parliament’s spending on political parties.

Parliament’s R490 million subsidy in 2021/22 for political parties is bigger than the annual budget for these votes: the National School of Government (R215m); Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (R461m); Public Enterprises (R298m); the Public Service Commission (R285m); Traditional Affairs (R180m); the Civilian Secretariat for the Police Service (R151m); and the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (R358m)⁹. This raises questions about Parliament’s priorities in spending.

Parliament’s Budget 2021 explains the funding for parties and claims there is accounting for this, although there is no publicly available evidence of such accounting: “Transfer payments: Parliament makes transfer payments to political parties represented in Parliament in proportion

Political Party Funding Act 2018

Funding of represented political parties by legislatures

23. (1) Parliament or a provincial legislature may not fund represented political parties other than through sections 57(2) and section 116(2) of the Constitution, section 34 of the Financial Management of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act, 2009 (Act No. 10 of 2009) and this Act.

(2) The accounting officer of a legislature as defined in section 1 of the Financial Management of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act, 2009 (Act No. 10 of 2009), must annually in the prescribed form and manner disclose any funding of represented political parties under sections 57(2) and 116(2) of the Constitution respectively, to the Commission.

⁸ <http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2021/ene/Vote%2002%20Parliament.pdf>

⁹ Table 2: Expenditure by national vote. ENE 2021. Available online here: <http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2021/ene/Foreward%20and%20Introduction.pdf>

to their representation, to enable the parties to effectively perform their functions in terms of section 57 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 and section 35 of the FMPPLA. Political parties must annually prepare and submit to Parliament annual financial statements which must detail how the allowances received in the previous financial year were expended, and be audited by a registered accountant and auditor who is subject to the Public Accountants' and Auditors' Board."

The Financial Management of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act

Section 34:

34(1) The Executive Authority must make regulations concerning the allocation and use of any funds provided by Parliament to political parties or to Members of Parliament...

(2) Before making regulations in terms of subsection (1) –

(a) the Speaker of the National Assembly must consult with the political parties represented in the National Assembly; and

(b) if delegations in, or individual delegates to, the National Council of Provinces are to receive funds, the Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces must consult with the delegations in the Council.

(3) The regulations must –

(a) regulate the allocation of funds in an equitable manner;

(b) specify the purposes for which funds may be used;

(c) provide for the prompt payment of funds into a bank account;

(d) stipulate the responsibilities of the Members of Parliament and parties to account for allocated funds;

(e) establish a procedure according to which Members of Parliament and parties account for the use of funds;

(f) prescribe a format for financial statements for accounting for the use of funds;

(g) require parties to submit audited financial statements in the prescribed format to the Accounting Officer;

(h) provide for the recovery of funds spent irregularly; and

(i) establish a dispute resolution procedure.

4) The regulations must authorise the Accounting Officer to withhold funds allocated to a party or a Member of Parliament –

(a) until the Accounting Officer receives—

(i) adequate information concerning the ability of the party or Member to manage and account for the funds;

(ii) any outstanding audit reports on the use of parliamentary funds by the party or Member; and

(iii) any other information reasonably necessary to confirm that the party or Member is entitled to the funds; and

(b) in instances of a qualified audit report in respect of such funding, until adequate measures are put in place to rectify the qualification.

(5) Each party represented in the Assembly must be provided with financial and administrative assistance in proportion to its representation to enable it and its leader to perform their functions in Parliament effectively.

7.3.Parliament's funding

Parliament's budget vote¹⁰ states that it is “the executive's proposal for Parliament's budget. The final budget will be determined by Parliament in accordance with the Financial Management of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act (2009)”. The Executive Authority of Parliament is jointly the Speaker of the National Assembly and the Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces, and the Accounting Authority is the Secretary to Parliament.

The Vote's purpose, in line with Parliament's mandate, is to enable the institution to represent the people, ensure government by the people under the Constitution, and represent the interest of the provinces in the national sphere of government. The policy priorities of Parliament should be aligned with the priorities and outcomes of the National Development Plan. Briefly, this does not appear to be reflected by the real budget of Parliament. This needs to change.

Parliament's budget vote hides the support for the parties.

However, this emerges in the Legislature's annual reports and other budget documents.

Annual reports are helpful for accountability purposes, but the drawback is that they are historical documents – by the time they are published, the money has long been spent – whereas budget documents are forward-looking so enable planning and theoretically could allow intervention before funds are spent.

Parliament's annual report for 2020/21¹¹ states: “The aim of the vote is to provide the support services required by Parliament to fulfil its constitutional mandate, assist political parties represented in Parliament to secure administrative support and service their constituents, and provide Members of Parliament (MPs) with the necessary services and facilities they require to discharge their constitutional responsibilities.”

This sounds reasonable, but the amount of funding and lack of accounting for it are problematic.

MPs get substantial salaries and a range of perks. We question the need for such excessive additional funding. The funding emphasis has to shift to servicing their constituents.

Parliament has four programmes:

¹⁰ Vote 2, Estimates of National Expenditure, Budget 2021.

¹¹ Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. Annual Report 2020/21. Available online here: <https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/BusinessPubs/AnnualReport2020-2021.pdf>

1. Strategic Leadership and Governance: This includes the Parliamentary Budget Office and the Office on Institutions Supporting Democracy.
2. Administration: This provides development programmes for Members and includes the Legislative Support Sector.
3. Core Business: This is to provide “procedural and legal advice, analysis, information and research, language, content and secretarial and legislative drafting services for meetings” of the NA, NCOP and their committees; to provide “public education, information and access to support public participation and to provide analysis, advice and content support for international parliamentary engagement”.
4. Support Services: “The purpose of this programme is to provide institutional communication services, human resource management, information communication technology, institutional support services and Members’ support services.”
5. Associated Services: “The purpose of this programme is (a) to provide travel, communication and other facilities for Members of Parliament to fulfil their duties as elected public representatives, and (b) to provide financial support to political parties represented in Parliament, their leaders and constituency offices.”

The support to parties runs through the Associated Services programme (as part of the programme, not the full programme), in the form of transfer payments.

Parliament’s annual report explains the transfers: “Transfer payments: Parliament makes transfer payments to political parties represented in Parliament in proportion to their representation, to enable the parties to effectively perform their functions in terms of section 57 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 and section 35 of the FMPPLA. Political parties must annually prepare and submit to Parliament annual financial statements which must detail how the allowances received in the previous financial year were expended, and be audited by a registered accountant and auditor who is subject to the Public Accountants' and Auditors' Board.” There is no indication that such financial statements were submitted or what they contained.

The Associated Services programme includes these sub-programmes and states that all are transfers to parties in terms of section 35 of the FMPPLA: Party leadership support, Political party support, Constituency support (this takes most of the funds).

Below is a breakdown of the transfers.¹²

	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21	2021/22
Associated Services: Full programme cost	R669.544m	698.103m	R704.395m	R711.594m	R746.064m
Associated Services: Transfers to non-profit institutions	R436.530m	R454.653m	R472.951m	R497.002m	R489.959m
Party Leadership Support	R10.860m	R11.693m	R11.489m	R11.577m	R10.279m
Party Support Allowance	R113.718m	R121.144m	R120.205m	R124.815m	R114.170m
Constituency Allowance	R309.311m	R320.057m	R340.149m	R358.967m	R365.510m
Disability Support	R1.432m	R1.759m	R1.108m	R1.643m	--
Transfers to provincial legislatures	R1.209m	-	-	-	--
% of Associated Services budget transferred to parties	65%	65%	67%	70%	66%

Parliament does not provide a breakdown of how much was transferred to each party.

There are no staff posts assigned to the Associated Services programme (Parliament has 1 349 posts¹³). There are also no performance indicators for this programme listed in the 2020/21 annual report, although the previous year's report lists two indicators: the average number of days to reimburse Members (less than four days for each of the five years listed), and the percentage of payments made "compliant to policy" (92.3% was the lowest, the other four years were 100%).

The transfers to parties do not include MPs travel and accommodation, as this is funded through Programme 4: Support Services.

The graphics below give an indication of the value of Parliament's subsidy to political parties.

¹² The transfer details in the sub-programmes for 2017/18 to 2020/21 are in note 26 to the financial statements in Parliament's annual reports, and the sub-programmes for 2021/22 and the full Associated Services programme costs for all years are from the Estimates of National Expenditure spreadsheets (Vote 2, Budget 2021).

¹³ 1 349 posts in 2020/21, according to Parliament's annual report 2020.21.

POLITICAL PARTIES VS SIU


One year: 2021/22



(Source: National Treasury, Budget 2021, Justice & Constitutional Development vote)

OUTA
ORGANISATION UNDOING TAX ABUSE

POLITICAL PARTIES VS STATE CAPTURE CLEAN-UP



OUTA
ORGANISATION UNDOING TAX ABUSE

7.4. Support for democracy: fund the SABC instead

Parliament's funding for political parties is justified as support for democracy.

We believe this funding may provide a more valuable contribution to the support of democracy by providing an annual grant for the public broadcasting services of the SABC instead.

As a public broadcaster, the SABC is a crucial institution for democracy.

Parliament's annual funding of political parties goes beyond providing administrative assistance to parties, and has for years failed to provide transparent accounting for this spending.

In 2021/22, Parliament transferred R490 million to political parties, and plans to transfer R503 million in 2022/23 and R505 million in 2023/24. This is in addition to funds for travel and accommodation.

POLITICAL PARTIES VS SABC

The next two years: 2022/23 and 2023/24

Parliament's planned
funding for political parties,
justified as support for
democracy

**R1 007 600 000
(R1 billion)**



**A better way of supporting
democracy**

**What this could be spent on
instead: Transfer these funds to
the SABC as a subsidy for the
public broadcaster**

"The SABC has a unique role and responsibility to play as the public service broadcaster. The high rates of illiteracy in the country, the limited distribution and cost of newspapers and the cost of subscription television makes SABC be the primary source of information for the majority of South Africans."

"A healthy democracy requires that the public be able to discuss, share and receive information relating to political, social and cultural matters affecting their lives. The public broadcaster plays a crucial role in strengthening democracy and democratic governance by ensuring that the general public, in particular, those with neither political nor economic influence or power, have access to a broad spectrum of views on issues of public concern."

– Judge Matojane, Johannesburg High Court, October 2017, case 81056/14

7.5. The provincial legislatures

All nine provinces transfer funds directly to parties through their own legislature budgets.

Further information on the individual provinces is in **Annexure A** below. We have also included graphics with comparisons of spending relating to the provinces in that annexure.

While a limited amount of funding would be in line with the FMPA as support to enable the parties to perform their functions in those legislatures effectively, as with Parliament, the funding in most is unreasonably substantial. All provincial legislatures provide direct transfers to represented political parties.

At least seven of the provinces passed their own provincial laws to fund represented political parties (Eastern Cape, Free State, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo, Northern Cape and North West), with at least six of these establishing their own funds to do this, despite the Constitution requiring national legislation for this (see Annexure A below for details of the provincial laws and funds). That national legislation – the PFRPPA and the PPFA which both set up the RPP Fund – explicitly states that the RPP Fund includes parties represented in provincial legislatures and RPP Fund annual reports show payments to provincial parties.

Most of the provincial funding acts refer to the Constitution as requiring national legislation for funding political parties participating in national and provincial legislatures; some acts refer to “supplementary funding” which “further enhances multi-party democracy” to justify their legislation. One act¹⁴ refers to the Constitution requiring national legislation for the funding and says “the Constitution promotes these principles in all spheres of government” (this is not in the section of the Constitution on political party funding¹⁵).

Most of the provincial acts seem to have copied each other or sections of each other.

The provincial acts seem designed to provide a veneer of respectability to what appears to be excessive funding by provincial legislatures well beyond the Constitution’s requirement of “financial and administrative assistance to each party represented in the legislature, in proportion

¹⁴ Northern Cape Political Party Fund Act no 7 of 2009. Available online here: <https://www.oua.co.za/web/content/201505>

¹⁵ Section 236 of the Constitution: “Funding for political parties: To enhance multi-party democracy, national legislation must provide for the funding of political parties participating in national and provincial legislatures on an equitable and proportional basis.”

to its representation, to enable the party and its leader to perform their functions in the legislature effectively”.

Indeed, the extended public funding appears to be intended to reduce dependence on funding from private sources or the parties’ own supporters. The Gauteng Legislature explicitly states this, in its vote in Budget 2021: “Transfers to political parties consist of constituency allowances and political party funding and enable members to fulfil their constitutional obligations, reduce dependence on private funding and enhance multi-party democracy.”

In addition, some of the provincial acts appear to be designed as a channel for funds raised from other non-legislature sources, including sources outside South Africa. For example, the Free State law says the fund must be credited with funds appropriated to it by the legislature, “contributions and donations to the Fund originating from sources within or outside the Republic”, interest, recoveries and “money fund-raised from sources within or outside the Republic”.

We were unable to establish whether any funding from such other sources was contributed to any of the provincial funds or, if it was, how it was distributed to parties. It is worth noting that not only is this information kept from the public, it is also kept from the rival parties.

Under the updated party funding law (the Political Party Funding Act of 2018), parties may not accept donations from certain donors including foreign governments and their agencies. This raises concern that the ongoing use of the provincial laws may be used to enable parties to circumvent that prohibition.

Some of the legislatures use multiple funding tracks, transferring funds both through the funds set up in terms of those Acts, and by making direct transfers. In some cases, it is not clear whether funds run through the fund or in addition to it. These appear to be deliberate duplications to boost the funding.

Provincial party funding laws were repealed in three provinces (the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and the North West) and a repeal bill for the Gauteng law is currently in that legislature. These repeals further indicate the constitutionally dubious nature of these provincial laws, and the Gauteng repeal bill¹⁶ explicitly refers to “some misgivings on the constitutionality of this Act... the passing of legislation dealing with political funding is the within the competency of Parliament not provincial legislatures”.

¹⁶ 2021. Gauteng Political Party Fund Repeal Bill 2021. Available here: <https://www.oua.co.za/web/content/201474>

However, there seems to be little regard for this constitutional problem, as evidenced by the fact that the Eastern Cape repealed its law in 2013, the North West repealed its law in 2016, and KwaZulu-Natal repealed its law in 2021, but all continue to fund political parties. Indeed, the Eastern Cape Legislature still justifies the payments in terms of the long-since repealed law.

Some provincial funds show large increases ahead of elections, which strengthens concerns that this funding is used to entrench the already represented parties in their seats at the expense of others trying to win their first seats. For example, the Limpopo Legislature increased party funding by 55.2 percent in 2021/22 (a local government election is due in November 2021), claiming this was due to “accurate costing” of political party funding; the North West Legislature increased party transfers by 52% in 2018/19 (there was a national and provincial election in May 2019), then reduced the amount the following year but subsequently increased it.

Taking public funds is easier than fundraising from supporters

“Transfers to political parties consist of constituency allowances and political party funding and enable members to fulfil their constitutional obligations, reduce dependence on private funding and enhance multi-party democracy.”

- Gauteng Legislature vote, in Budget 2021

The constitutionally dubious funding by legislatures

“There has however, been some misgivings on the constitutionality of this Act. Firstly, as indicated above, the passing of legislation dealing with political funding is the within the competency of Parliament not provincial legislatures. Thus, the enactment of the Gauteng Act, although with noble intentions, fell outside the legislative competence of the Legislature. This was out of kilter with both sections 236 and 41 of the Constitution.

“Secondly, the enactment of national legislation in the form of the Political Party Funding Act, 6 of 2018, has also had profound implications on the Gauteng Act. The scope of this new national Act is very wide and covers matters provided for in the provincial Act.”

- The memo explaining the need for the Gauteng Political Party Fund Repeal Bill of 2021, which will repeal the act passed in 2007.

8. Annexure A: The provincial laws and funds

8.1.1. Eastern Cape Legislature

In June 2010, the Eastern Cape passed the **Eastern Cape Political Party Fund Act** of 2010¹⁷, under then Premier Noxolo Kieviet, which established the **Eastern Cape Political Party Fund**. Three years later in April 2013, shortly before the election, this was repealed by Kieviet through the **Eastern Cape Political Party Fund Repeal Act**¹⁸.

Although this act was repealed, the Eastern Cape Legislature is still making transfers to parties in terms of the repealed Act and the now closed fund: the province's legislature vote in Budget 2021 says this: "The institution will transfer quarterly the funds to political parties represented at Legislature in terms of the Political Party Funding Act." These transfers are under Programme 2: Facilities for Members and Political Parties, and are explicitly described in the budget as "once-off allocations for constituency allowances and funds for political parties represented in the Provincial Legislature", and as "constituency allowances and caucus funding (approved by the Rules Committee)".

These transfers to parties are just part of the funding in that programme. The Legislature's vote in Budget 2016 also refers to "transfers and subsidies which includes constituency allowances as well as political parties' fund for political parties represented at Legislature", and in Budget 2014 refers to transfers including "Political Parties' Fund expenditure". The Eastern Cape Legislature also made transfers to parties before the 2010 Act was passed.

The act makes the Secretary of the legislature responsible for the fund, allocates funding according to representation in the legislature, and requires parties to account for funding; money irregularly spent or not accounted for may be reclaimed.

The act says the fund "must" be credited with funds appropriated to it by the legislature, "contributions and donations to the Fund originating from sources within or outside the Republic", interest and recoveries. There is no block on sources of funds; this may be used as a way to circumvent the current national legislation which bars funding from foreign governments or entities.

Annual reports for the Eastern Cape Political Party Fund could not be found. The legislature annual reports give a breakdown of transfers to each party, but no other information on the fund or any other donations or income it may have received.

¹⁷ 29 June 2010. Eastern Cape Political Party Fund Act no 3 of 2010 (Eastern Cape). Eastern Cape Provincial Gazette no 2404. (Proclamation date unknown.) Available here: <https://www.oua.co.za/web/content/201437>

¹⁸ 31 May 2013. Eastern Cape Political Party Fund Repeal Act, no 2 of 2013. Eastern Cape Provincial Gazette no 2966. (Effective on date of gazetting.) Available here: <https://www.oua.co.za/web/content/201439>

POLITICAL PARTIES VS RUNNING HOSPITALS

One year: 2019/20



(Source: Allocations to hospitals, Eastern Cape Provincial Gazette 4522 of 15 March 2021)

OUTA
ORGANISATION UNDOING TAX ABUSE

8.1.2. Free State Legislature

In July 2008, the Free State gazetted the **Free State Political Party Fund Act** of 2008¹⁹, setting up the **Free State Political Party Fund** managed by the provincial legislature.

The fund is under the control of the Secretary to the legislature and allocates funding according to representation in the legislature. Parties must account for funding; money irregularly spent or not accounted for may be reclaimed.

The act says the fund “must” be credited with funds appropriated to it by the legislature, “contributions and donations to the Fund originating from sources within or outside the Republic”, interest, recoveries and “money fund-raised from sources within or outside the Republic”. There is no block on sources of funds; this may now be used as a way to circumvent the current national legislation which bars funding from foreign governments or entities.

In Budget 2020, the Legislature vote says: “Transfer payments: The funds are allocated to constituent, research, study aid and office allowances payable to represented political parties. Funds are also allocated to Political Party Funding as determined through funding formulas of the Political Party Fund Act 4 of 2008.” The funding through the Fund itself is not clearly identified: “Political Support Services:

¹⁹ 25 July 2008. Free State Political Party Fund Act no 3 of 2008. Free State Provincial Gazette, no 52. (Proclamation date unknown.) Available here: <https://www.ouata.co.za/web/content/201440>

Political support in terms of the Political Party Fund Act (2008), constituents and office support to represented political parties at the Free State Legislature form part of programme 2.”

The footnotes to the financials in the Legislature’s annual report show that the transfers to the parties include five categories of funding: Political Party Fund, constituency allowance, office allowance, study allowance and research allowance.


In Budget 2021, the Legislature vote says: “Political Party funding has been moved to IEC thus elected representatives mandate will no longer be funded within the Budget of the Legislature.”

However, only the Political Party Fund item has been removed, resulting in a budget cut of R26.992 million in transfers. The legislature vote complains that “Under-Budgeting on Transfers negatively affects Political Parties representatives to execute the constituency’s mandate which might lead lower confidence on the members and affect or change the landscape of the South African democracy.”

Annual reports for the Free State Political Party Fund could not be found. The legislature annual reports refer to the fund, but provide little information on it and no information on any other donations or income it may have received.

POLITICAL PARTIES VS EPWP JOBS

One year: 2020/21



(Source: National Treasury, Free State Budget 2021, Public Works & Infrastructure vote)

OUTA
ORGANISATION UNDOING TAX ABUSE

8.1.3. Gauteng Legislature

In 2007, Gauteng passed the **Gauteng Political Party Fund Act** no 3 of 2007²⁰, which was signed by then Premier Mbhazima Shilowa, which established the **Gauteng Political Party Fund**. This is in the process of being repealed and the fund disestablished, through the **Gauteng Political Party Fund Repeal Bill** of 2021²¹, which did not appear to have been passed by October 2021. The memo attached to this Bill says the repeal is due to “some misgivings on the constitutionality of this Act”, and further suggests that the Constitution and national Political Party Funding Act of 2018 may allow the Legislature to provide “some form of financial and administrative support to represented political parties”, with reference to section 23(1) of the PPFA and section 116(2) of the Constitution.

The act established and “supplementary funding” of parties in the Gauteng Legislature as it “further enhances multi-party democracy”. The act allows the fund to be credited with “contributions and donations to the fund originating from sources within or outside the Republic”. The Secretary of the Legislature is responsible for the fund, and allocations are largely based on representivity in the legislature. Funds must be accounted for and any spent irregularly or not accounted for may be reclaimed.

The Gauteng Legislature budget 2021 says: “Transfers to political parties consist of constituency allowances and political party funding and enable members to fulfil their constitutional obligations, reduce dependence on private funding and enhance multi-party democracy.”

Also from the Budget: “Section 236 of the Constitution promotes multi-party democracy and requires national legislation to provide for funding of political parties participating in provincial legislatures on an equitable and proportional basis. Party funding in the Provincial Legislature is aimed at enhancing democracy and promoting active citizenry as political parties are seen as vital public institutions for increasing citizens’ participation in their own governance and in democracy. The objective of the constituency allowance is to enable political parties to establish and maintain an infrastructure to serve the interests of constituents and to enable their members to provide services to the public.”

The Gauteng Legislature annual report provides a breakdown of funds transferred to each party. There doesn’t appear to be a separate annual report for the fund itself, and the legislature report does not indicate whether the fund received any donations from other non-legislature sources.

²⁰ 2007. Gauteng Political Party Fund Act no 3 of 2007. (With effect from 17 January 2008.) Available here: <https://www.oua.co.za/web/content/201464>

²¹ 2021. Gauteng Political Party Fund Repeal Bill 2021. Available here: <https://www.oua.co.za/web/content/201474>

POLITICAL PARTIES VS TOURISM

One year: 2021/22



(Source: National Treasury, Gauteng Budget 2021, Economic Development vote)

OUTA
ORGANISATION UNDOING TAX ABUSE

8.1.4. KwaZulu-Natal Legislature

In December 2008, KZN passed the **KwaZulu-Natal Funding of Represented Political Parties Act of 2008**²², which sets up the **Political Parties' Fund**. Regulations were also issued in terms of this act²³. This was signed by then Premier S'bu Ndebele. In May 2021, this was repealed in the **KwaZulu-Natal Funding of Represented Political Parties Act Repeal Act**²⁴. Again, the national funding law was cited as the reason for the repeal. However, provincial funding for the parties appears to be continuing.

KZN Legislature budget 2021:

The President has determined that the Political Party Funding Act, 2018 will commence on 1 April 2021. This Act stipulates that legislatures may not fund political parties represented in

²² 19 December 2008. KwaZulu-Natal Funding of Represented Political Parties Act no 7 of 2008. KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Gazette volume 2 no 212. (Appears to have been effective from date of gazetting.) Available here: <https://www.ouata.co.za/web/content/201500>

²³ 19 December 2008. Regulations in terms of the KwaZulu-Natal Funding of Represented Political Parties Act no 7 of 2008. KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Gazette volume 2 no 212. Available here: <https://www.ouata.co.za/web/content/201500>

²⁴ 3 May 2021. KwaZulu-Natal Funding of Represented Political Parties Act Repeal Act no 6 of 2021. KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Gazette no 2278. (Appears to have been effective from the date of gazetting.) Available here: <https://www.ouata.co.za/web/content/201501>

the Legislature other than through Section 116 of the Constitution – i.e. in terms of its Rules and Orders (and not through provincial legislation). This has resulted in the need to repeal the KZN Funding of Political Parties Act, 2008, and to put in place measures to ensure that any funding of political parties by the Legislature is fully compliant with the national Act and the Constitution. The legislature is therefore in the process of ensuring implementation of the above through the processing of a repeal Bill and the amendment of existing party funding policies. This will impact on the Political Parties’ Fund (PPF) as an entity, but will not impact on the budget allocated for funding political parties over the MTEF.

The provincial funding runs through programme 2 “Parliamentary Business”, which includes “Funding for political parties (eg constit. allowance)” and “Political Parties’ Fund”.

Budget 2021 explains that Programme 2 is transfers and subsidies, including funding for political parties “including the constituency and secretarial allowances” and for the Political Parties Fund. The budget makes it clear that the full programme amount is transferred to the parties.


The provincial act says the fund is funded from money appropriated by the provincial legislature, contributions and donations “from sources approved by the Member of the Executive Council responsible for finance, whether from within or outside of the Province”, interest and money received “from any other source”.

The legislature Secretary is responsible for overseeing the fund, allocations are linked to the representation of parties in the legislature, parties must account for their allocations, and allocations must be gazetted.

The annual report for the fund is incorporated in the legislature’s report. This lists allocations per party, but does not have any indication of whether any additional funds or donations were received.

POLITICAL PARTIES VS SUPPORT FOR SMALL FARMERS

One year: 2021/22



(Source: National Treasury, KZN Budget 2021, Agriculture & Rural Development vote)

OUTA
ORGANISATION UNDOING TAX ABUSE

8.1.5. Limpopo Legislature

The province passed the **Limpopo Political Party Fund Act** of 2008²⁵, which established the **Limpopo Political Party Fund**. A copy of the bill was available but the act itself could not be found, although subsequent legislature votes refer to the act. The bill was published in the provincial gazette on 28 November 2008, with a public comment deadline just four working days later on 2 December 2008. In 2009, regulations²⁶ in terms of this act were issued by the Speaker of the Limpopo Legislature.

The regulations allow parties to rollover up to 75% of their allocations to the following year, require separate books to account for funding. Funds are allocated based on the total allocation available divided by the total votes cast multiplied by each party's total votes, rather than on the number of MPLs a party has.

The Limpopo Legislature vote in Budget 2021 shows the unrestrained funding for parties. It states:

“Transfers and Subsidies – The institution transfers funds to political parties represented in the Legislature. This represents constituency allowance, political party funding and salaries to political support staff. The funding is made available to ensure that Members have functioning constituency offices, and parties have programmes to educate their Members on political activities. This item reflects an increase of 55.2 percent in 2021/22, 5.3 percent and 2.7 percent in the 2022/23 and 2023/24 financial years respectively. This is caused by the accurate costing of Political Party Funding.”

It's not clear how this “accurate costing” was arrived at.

The funding runs through the Legislature's Programme “Facilities for Members and Political Parties”, sub-programme “Political Support Services”; the transfers to non-profits are the bulk of the amounts for this sub-programme.

The bill (and presumably the act) says the fund must be credited with money appropriated to it by the provincial legislature, “contributions and donations to the Fund originating from sources within or outside the Republic”, interest and money recovered or accruing “from any other source”. The Secretary to the Legislature is responsible for the fund. Allocations are linked to representation in the legislature, parties must account for their allocations, and money irregularly spent may be recovered.


The regulations allow parties to roll over up to 75% of unspent allocations to the following year.

An annual report for the fund could not be found. The legislature's annual report contains limited information on this fund.

²⁵ 26 November 2008. Limpopo Political Party Fund Bill 2008. Limpopo Provincial Gazette no 1562. Available here: <https://www.oua.co.za/web/content/201502> The act is referred to in the subsequent regulations as the Limpopo Political Party Fund Act no 4 of 2008.

²⁶ 19 August 2009. Limpopo Political Party Fund Regulations 2009. Limpopo Provincial Gazette no 1669. Available here: <https://www.oua.co.za/web/content/201504>

POLITICAL PARTIES VS SAFE SCHOOL TOILETS



(Source: Pit toilet cost estimates from Section 27)

OUTA
ORGANISATION UNDOING TAX ABUSE

8.1.6. Mpumalanga Legislature

References to the Mpumalanga Political Parties Support Fund Bill were found, but a copy of this act or even the bill could be traced so it's not clear if this was passed.

The legislature vote in Budget 2009 refers to a "Constituency Fund" for parties, implying that the act was passed.

The Legislature vote in Budget 2019 includes "Political Party funding for the enhancement of democracy, caucus and constituency work for Members of the Provincial Legislature."

An annual report for a fund could not be found. A legislature annual report contains a brief mention of funds allocated to parties but no details; other online legislature annual reports could not be opened.

POLITICAL PARTIES VS FIREFIGHTERS

One year: 2019/20



(Source: Reply to Parliament, RCW237 of 25 June 2021)

OUTA
ORGANISATION UNDOING TAX ABUSE

8.1.7. Northern Cape Legislature

The **Northern Cape Political Party Fund Act**²⁷ was passed in 2009, established the **Northern Cape Political Party Fund** and introduced the fund in the legislature budget in 2010/11. This added to existing funding for political parties.

The Legislature's Programme 2 "Facilities for Members" includes sub-programme 2 "Political Party Support", which includes the transfers to parties.

The Legislature vote in Budget 2021 shows a significant increase in part funding. It says: "The programme's budget increase with an amount of R13.429 million or 26 per cent in the 2021/22 main budget as compared to the revised estimate and this is mainly due to once off allocation particularly within the political party support sub programme." The 2021/22 year includes the local government election, which may explain the big increase.

²⁷ 18 November 2009. Northern Cape Political Party Fund Act no 7 of 2009. Northern Cape Provincial Gazette no 1357. (It is unclear when this act took effect as it refers to an unspecified date to be proclaimed.) Available here: <https://www.ouata.co.za/web/content/201505>

Budget 2021 further says: “The Legislature transfer funds annually to the Political Parties as well as a discretionary allowance for the Speaker and Deputy Speaker for social responsibility. The allocation is aimed at assisting political parties to carry out their constitutional mandate of advancing the ideals of democracy. The allocation of money to the political parties is based on a prescribed formula. Provision has been made for constituency allowance of members of the Legislature, which is aimed at supporting members to do constituency work. Caucus fund provide financial and administrative assistance to each political party represented in the Legislature, in proportion to its representation, to enable the party and its leaders to perform their functions.”

The act says the fund must be credited with money appropriated to it by the provincial legislature, “contributions and donations to the Fund originating from sources within or outside the Republic”, interest, money recovered or accruing “from any other source” and “money fund-raised from sources within or outside the Republic”. The Secretary to the Legislature is responsible for the fund. Allocations are linked to representation in the legislature, parties must account for their allocations, and money irregularly spent may be recovered. Unspent money may be rolled over to the following year, both by the fund and the parties.

POLITICAL PARTIES VS SCHOOL SPORTS

One year: 2021/22



(Source: National Treasury, NC Budget 2021, Sports, Arts & Culture vote)

OUTA
ORGANISATION UNDOING TAX ABUSE

8.1.8. North West Legislature

In 2010, the North West passed the **Political Party Funding Act of 2010**²⁸, which established the **North West Province Political Party Fund**. Regulations in terms of the act were issued in 2011²⁹. The act was repealed in October 2016, in the **North West Political Party Fund Repeal Act 2015**³⁰. The memorandum to the Repeal bill said the Fund had never been established due to resource constraints, so the Repeal Act did not include anything about winding it up. The signed Repeal Act was gazetted on 31 October 2016 but backdated to take effect from 1 April 2016.

Despite the Repeal Act, funding of political parties continued, with subsequent legislature budgets including “Constituency Allowance” and “Political Party Fund” in the party transfers. Despite the claim of a funding crisis, the legislature increased party transfers by 52% from R34.819 million in 2017/18 to R52.874 million in 2018/19 (there was a national and provincial election in May 2019), then reduced the amount the following year but subsequently increased it. This increase in funding shows how such funding for represented parties is used to disadvantage parties trying to gain their first seats in an election.

In its 2018/19 annual report, the legislature explained how funding continued: “The Political Party Fund Act and its regulations was repealed in 2015 and replaced with a Legislature policy, i.e. the Member’s Enabling Facilities Policy, which amongst other things regulates Political Party funding matters in the North West. On the National Front, the Political Party Funding matters are under review and currently before Parliament.”

By 2021, the North West was justifying the funding of parties in terms of the national Political Party Funding Act 2018.

The funding is through Programme 3: Legislature Operations, and is listed as transfers and subsidies. In earlier budgets it is listed as transfers and subsidies to provinces and municipalities.

This is what the Legislature Budget 2021 says of the national Act: “The implementation of the Political Party Funding Act will have far-reaching consequences for good governance and ethical political activity. It will strengthen the confidence of citizens in the democratic political process and enable them to assert their right to information.”

However, in the same budget, the Legislature confirms it continues its own funding of parties: “Transfers to political parties comprise of constituency allowance, secretarial allowance, research allowance and political party funding that enable members to fulfil their constitutional obligations and thus reducing dependency on private funding and enhancing multi-party democracy.”

²⁸ The Political Party Funding Act no 3 of 2010 could not be found. However, it is referenced in the North West Political Party Fund Repeal Act no 5 of 2015, and in the memorandum to the Bill, which is attached to the Repeal Act. The Repeal Act and memorandum are online here: <https://www.oua.co.za/web/content/201526>

²⁹ 11 August 2011. North West Political Party Fund Act 2010 Regulations. North West Provincial Gazette no 6920. Available online here: <https://www.oua.co.za/web/content/201527>

³⁰ 31 October 2016. North West Political Party Fund Repeal Act no 5 of 2015. North West Provincial Gazette no 7703. The memorandum to the Bill is attached to it. Available online here: <https://www.oua.co.za/web/content/201526>

It also says: “The allocations to political parties are managed through a Party-Political funding policy which outlines the factors that are considered when funding is calculated e.g. the number of Politicians per Researcher, the secretariat services for the various parties etc. The main objective of these transfers is to reduce reliance on private funding and to enhance multi-party democracy. Parties are entitled to a monthly allowance for each MPL to run a constituency office, and each political party makes its own constituency arrangements. Most constituency offices employ an administrator to be available to the public even when Parliament is in session.”

No annual report for the fund could be found. One legislature annual report³¹ includes the amounts transferred to each of the four parties; the amounts spent by each party could not be determined as none had finished preparing financial statements. A later legislature annual report³² listed the amounts per party and showed that all four parties spent in full exactly the amounts they received.

POLITICAL PARTIES VS GRADE R CHILDREN

One year: 2021/22



(Source: Allocation for Schools, North West Provincial Gazette no 8221, 1 June 2021)

OUTA
ORGANISATION UNDOING TAX ABUSE

³¹ North West Provincial Legislature Annual Report 2015/16.

³² North West Provincial Legislature Annual Report 2018/19.

8.1.9. Western Cape Legislature

The Western Cape Provincial Parliament is the only province which does not appear to have passed its own political party funding legislation.

However, this provincial legislature also provides financial support for political parties.

Since 2019, this runs through Programme 4: “Members Support”, with sub-programmes: Members Administration; Enabling Allowance (includes expenses for office travel, accommodation and telecommunication); and Political Parties Support (constituency allowances, secretarial allowances and conditional allowances). The amounts for the Political Parties Support sub-programme exactly match the transfers to non-profit institutions in the Members Support programme, indicating that this full amount is transferred directly to the parties.

Up to 2018, these funds ran through Programme 2: “Facilities for Members and Political Parties”, with sub-programmes: Facilities and Benefits to Members (includes enabling allowances for office travel, accommodation and telecommunications); and Political Parties Support Services (includes constituency allowances, secretarial allowances and conditional allowances).

In the Western Cape Provincial Parliament budget 2021, sub-programme 4.3 “Political Parties Support” (the full transfer to political parties) is described as:

to manage the payment of:

- constituency allowances which is to enable political parties represented in the Provincial Parliament to establish and maintain infrastructure in constituencies to serve the interests of constituents
- secretarial allowances which is to enable political parties represented in the Provincial Parliament to establish and maintain their own administrative infrastructure within the precincts of the Provincial Parliament
- allowances for special programmes to enable Members to arrange programmes within their constituencies in the interest of oversight, law-making and public participation in the Western Cape Provincial Parliament

POLITICAL PARTIES VS ARTS & CULTURE NGOs

One year: 2021/22



(Source: National Treasury, WC Budget 2021, Cultural Affairs & Sport vote)

OUTA
ORGANISATION UNDOING TAX ABUSE

9. Annexure B: 15 years of public funding for political parties 2009/10 to 2023/24

Below are the details of the government funding for political parties.

The amounts are in Rand.

The references to “4th Parl”, “5th Parl” and “6th Parl” refer to the Fourth Parliament (after May 2009 election), the Fifth Parliament (after May 2014 election) and the Sixth Parliament (after May 2019 election).

These tables are also available as an Excel spreadsheet attached to this report³³.

TOTAL all 11 funding streams				
4th Parl	2009/10		609 860 000	
4th Parl	2010/11		746 646 000	
4th Parl	2011/12		811 529 380	
4th Parl	2012/13		897 294 000	
4th Parl	2013/14		962 964 000	
5th Parl	2014/15		996 401 000	
5th Parl	2015/16		1 075 279 000	
5th Parl	2016/17		1 158 408 998	
5th Parl	2017/18		1 203 310 183	
5th Parl	2018/19		1 306 481 717	
6th Parl	2019/20		1 329 992 048	
6th Parl	2020/21		1 363 282 000	
6th Parl	2021/22		1 420 743 000	
	Sub-total	Transfers 2009/10 - 2021/22 (13 years to date)		13 882 191 326
6th Parl	2022/23		1 446 030 000	
6th Parl	2023/24		1 444 484 000	
	Sub-total	Transfers 2022/23 - 2023/24 (next 2 years)		2 890 514 000
	2009/10 - 2023/24	Total transfers 2009/10 - 2023/24 (15 years)		16 772 705 326

³³ The spreadsheet is available here: <https://outa.co.za/web/content/202039?unique=false&download=true>

Represented Political Party Fund				
Home Affairs vote transfer to Electoral Commission for distribution to parties				
4th Parl	2009/10		92 823 000	
4th Parl	2010/11		98 095 000	
4th Parl	2011/12		103 981 000	
4th Parl	2012/13		109 180 000	
4th Parl	2013/14		115 185 000	
5th Parl	2014/15		122 096 000	
5th Parl	2015/16		127 712 000	
5th Parl	2016/17		134 480 000	
5th Parl	2017/18		141 204 000	
5th Parl	2018/19		149 394 000	
6th Parl	2019/20		157 760 000	
6th Parl	2020/21		162 723 000	
6th Parl	2021/22		166 812 000	
	Sub-total	Transfers 2009/10 - 2021/22 (13 years to date)		1 681 445 000
6th Parl	2022/23		171 016 000	
6th Parl	2023/24		171 672 000	
	Sub-total	Transfers 2022/23 - 2023/24 (next 2 years)		342 688 000
	2009/10 - 2023/24	Total transfers 2009/10 - 2023/24 (15 years)		2 024 133 000
Source: (1) Home Affairs vote (Allocation to RPPF), table 5.3. (2) RPPF annual reports, Annexure A ("Government appropriation").				

Parliament				
4th Parl	2009/10		258 700 000	
4th Parl	2010/11		277 400 000	
4th Parl	2011/12		297 552 380	
4th Parl	2012/13		311 378 000	
4th Parl	2013/14		333 102 000	
5th Parl	2014/15		352 173 000	
5th Parl	2015/16		371 033 000	
5th Parl	2016/17		403 264 000	
5th Parl	2017/18		414 690 000	
5th Parl	2018/19		438 743 000	
6th Parl	2019/20		463 312 000	
6th Parl	2020/21		454 140 000	
6th Parl	2021/22		489 959 000	
	Sub-total	Transfers 2009/10 - 2021/22 (13 years to date)		4 865 446 380
6th Parl	2022/23		502 800 000	
6th Parl	2023/24		504 800 000	
	Sub-total	Transfers 2022/23 - 2023/24 (next 2 years)		1 007 600 000
	2009/10 - 2023/24	Total transfers 2009/10 - 2023/24 (15 years)		5 873 046 380
Source: (1) Parliament budget vote, sub-programme: Associated Services. (2) Budget ENE spreadsheet, vote 2 (table 2.3 Vote transfers & subsidies); budget lists amounts as "transfers". (3) Parliament annual reports, "Transfers to non-profit institutions" (note 26 identifies these as transfers to political parties). Sub-programmes: Political Party Support + Constituency Support + Party Leadership Support.				

Eastern Cape Legislature				
4th Parl	2009/10		42 387 000	
4th Parl	2010/11		63 209 000	
4th Parl	2011/12		98 117 000	
4th Parl	2012/13		90 209 000	
4th Parl	2013/14		104 309 000	
5th Parl	2014/15		98 062 000	
5th Parl	2015/16		98 272 000	
5th Parl	2016/17		103 886 000	
5th Parl	2017/18		107 509 000	
5th Parl	2018/19		118 105 000	
6th Parl	2019/20		114 135 000	
6th Parl	2020/21		142 582 000	
6th Parl	2021/22		120 072 000	
	Sub-total	Transfers 2009/10 - 2021/22 (13 years to date)		1 300 854 000
6th Parl	2022/23		115 172 000	
6th Parl	2023/24		116 136 000	
	Sub-total	Transfers 2022/23 - 2023/24 (next 2 years)		231 308 000
	2009/10 - 2023/24	Total transfers 2009/10 - 2023/24 (15 years)		1 532 162 000
Source: Eastern Cape Legislature budget: Annual allocation to parties, including from the EC Political Party Fund. Transfers are to "non-profit institutions" under Programme: Facilities for Members & Political Parties", and are described as "once-off allocations for constituency allowances and funds for political parties represented in the Provincial Legislature".				

Free State Legislature				
4th Parl	2009/10		38 705 000	
4th Parl	2010/11		39 393 000	
4th Parl	2011/12		39 200 000	
4th Parl	2012/13		49 995 000	
4th Parl	2013/14		48 707 000	
5th Parl	2014/15		48 690 000	
5th Parl	2015/16		59 586 000	
5th Parl	2016/17		58 145 998	
5th Parl	2017/18		61 132 183	
5th Parl	2018/19		62 747 717	
6th Parl	2019/20		62 596 048	
6th Parl	2020/21		69 649 000	
6th Parl	2021/22		40 295 000	
	Sub-total	Transfers 2009/10 - 2021/22 (13 years to date)		678 841 946
6th Parl	2022/23		39 878 000	
6th Parl	2023/24		26 913 000	
	Sub-total	Transfers 2022/23 - 2023/24 (next 2 years)		66 791 000
	2009/10 - 2023/24	Total transfers 2009/10 - 2023/24 (15 years)		745 632 946
<p>Source: Free State Legislature budget, Programme 2: Facilities for Members & Political Parties ("entities receiving transfers") &/or FS Legislature annual reports ("transfers & subsidies"). Transfers include some of these: Political Party Fund + Constituency Allowance + Office Allowance + Study Allowance + Research Allowance (parts of this are not direct transfers so are not included in this tally).</p>				

Gauteng Legislature				
4th Parl	2009/10		22 000 000	
4th Parl	2010/11		54 449 000	
4th Parl	2011/12		48 296 000	
4th Parl	2012/13		84 169 000	
4th Parl	2013/14		88 044 000	
5th Parl	2014/15		94 776 000	
5th Parl	2015/16		97 911 000	
5th Parl	2016/17		110 585 000	
5th Parl	2017/18		114 907 000	
5th Parl	2018/19		121 572 000	
6th Parl	2019/20		126 041 000	
6th Parl	2020/21		142 830 000	
6th Parl	2021/22		150 921 000	
	Sub-total	Transfers 2009/10 - 2021/22 (13 years to date)		1 256 501 000
6th Parl	2022/23		158 015 000	
6th Parl	2023/24		162 344 000	
	Sub-total	Transfers 2022/23 - 2023/24 (next 2 years)		320 359 000
	2009/10 - 2023/24	Total transfers 2009/10 - 2023/24 (15 years)		1 576 860 000
Source: Gauteng Legislature budget: Annual allocation to parties: Political Party Fund + Constituency Allowances. In Budget 2021, Table 7.5.2 shows "constituency allowances" and PPF funds are transferred to "other entities", ie to the parties.				

	KwaZulu-Natal Legislature			
4th Parl	2009/10		67 331 000	
4th Parl	2010/11		72 355 000	
4th Parl	2011/12		74 555 000	
4th Parl	2012/13		77 456 000	
4th Parl	2013/14		81 826 000	
5th Parl	2014/15		84 240 000	
5th Parl	2015/16		81 055 000	
5th Parl	2016/17		101 733 000	
5th Parl	2017/18		109 113 000	
5th Parl	2018/19		111 779 000	
6th Parl	2019/20		113 767 000	
6th Parl	2020/21		114 941 000	
6th Parl	2021/22		119 560 000	
	Sub-total	Transfers 2009/10 - 2021/22 (13 years to date)		1 209 711 000
6th Parl	2022/23		125 273 000	
6th Parl	2023/24		130 785 000	
	Sub-total	Transfers 2022/23 - 2023/24 (next 2 years)		256 058 000
	2009/10 - 2023/24	Total transfers 2009/10 - 2023/24 (15 years)		1 465 769 000
Source: KZN Legislature budget: Annual allocation to parties, including from KZN Represented Political Parties Fund (KZN RPPF Act 2008). RPP Fund + Secretarial Assistance + Constituency Allowance. Some years the Secretarial Assistance & Constituency Allowance are a combined figure. Budget 2021 shows in Table 2.7 that the full amounts are transfers to non-profit institutions (ie political parties).				

Limpopo Legislature				
4th Parl	2009/10		23 596 000	
4th Parl	2010/11		45 223 000	
4th Parl	2011/12		51 738 000	
4th Parl	2012/13		65 291 000	
4th Parl	2013/14		70 329 000	
5th Parl	2014/15		70 490 000	
5th Parl	2015/16		85 613 000	
5th Parl	2016/17		91 564 000	
5th Parl	2017/18		94 426 000	
5th Parl	2018/19		105 437 000	
6th Parl	2019/20		112 661 000	
6th Parl	2020/21		79 890 000	
6th Parl	2021/22		125 000 000	
	Sub-total	Transfers 2009/10 - 2021/22 (13 years to date)		1 021 258 000
6th Parl	2022/23		132 000 000	
6th Parl	2023/24		136 000 000	
	Sub-total	Transfers 2022/23 - 2023/24 (next 2 years)		268 000 000
	2009/10 - 2023/24	Total transfers 2009/10 - 2023/24 (15 years)		1 289 258 000
Source: Limpopo Legislature budget: Programme: Facilities for Members & Political Parties", subprogramme "Political Support Services", listed as transfers to non-profit institutions.				

Mpumalanga Legislature				
4th Parl	2009/10		12 268 000	
4th Parl	2010/11		30 167 000	
4th Parl	2011/12		17 343 000	
4th Parl	2012/13		24 504 000	
4th Parl	2013/14		36 904 000	
5th Parl	2014/15		37 894 000	
5th Parl	2015/16		58 731 000	
5th Parl	2016/17		53 554 000	
5th Parl	2017/18		42 948 000	
5th Parl	2018/19		60 496 000	
6th Parl	2019/20		53 541 000	
6th Parl	2020/21		59 867 000	
6th Parl	2021/22		56 162 000	
	Sub-total	Transfers 2009/10 - 2021/22 (13 years to date)		544 379 000
6th Parl	2022/23		55 486 000	
6th Parl	2023/24		42 202 000	
	Sub-total	Transfers 2022/23 - 2023/24 (next 2 years)		97 688 000
	2009/10 - 2023/24	Total transfers 2009/10 - 2023/24 (15 years)		642 067 000
Source: Mpumalanga Legislature budget: "Transfers to political parties".				

Northern Cape Legislature				
4th Parl	2009/10		17 900 000	
4th Parl	2010/11		19 077 000	
4th Parl	2011/12		20 231 000	
4th Parl	2012/13		21 073 000	
4th Parl	2013/14		22 189 000	
5th Parl	2014/15		23 298 000	
5th Parl	2015/16		27 786 000	
5th Parl	2016/17		30 685 000	
5th Parl	2017/18		42 377 000	
5th Parl	2018/19		44 581 000	
6th Parl	2019/20		41 417 000	
6th Parl	2020/21		36 246 000	
6th Parl	2021/22		47 476 000	
	Sub-total	Transfers 2009/10 - 2021/22 (13 years to date)		394 336 000
6th Parl	2022/23		38 247 000	
6th Parl	2023/24		40 159 000	
	Sub-total	Transfers 2022/23 - 2023/24 (next 2 years)		78 406 000
	2009/10 - 2023/24	Total transfers 2009/10 - 2023/24 (15 years)		472 742 000
Source: Northern Cape Legislature budget: Annual allocation to parties. Includes: Political Party Fund + Constituency Allowance.				

North West Legislature				
4th Parl	2009/10		11 781 000	
4th Parl	2010/11		22 256 000	
4th Parl	2011/12		33 086 000	
4th Parl	2012/13		33 926 000	
4th Parl	2013/14		30 797 000	
5th Parl	2014/15		31 512 000	
5th Parl	2015/16		32 726 000	
5th Parl	2016/17		33 507 000	
5th Parl	2017/18		34 819 000	
5th Parl	2018/19		52 874 000	
6th Parl	2019/20		39 715 000	
6th Parl	2020/21		51 794 000	
6th Parl	2021/22		54 573 000	
	Sub-total	Transfers 2009/10 - 2021/22 (13 years to date)		463 366 000
6th Parl	2022/23		57 193 000	
6th Parl	2023/24		59 938 000	
	Sub-total	Transfers 2022/23 - 2023/24 (next 2 years)		117 131 000
	2009/10 - 2023/24	Total transfers 2009/10 - 2023/24 (15 years)		580 497 000
Source: North West Legislature budget: Annual allocation to parties. Political Party Fund + Constituency Allowance + Secretarial Allowance + Research Allowance. Listed as transfers to parties.				

Western Cape Provincial Parliament				
4th Parl	2009/10		22 369 000	
4th Parl	2010/11		25 022 000	
4th Parl	2011/12		27 430 000	
4th Parl	2012/13		30 113 000	
4th Parl	2013/14		31 572 000	
5th Parl	2014/15		33 170 000	
5th Parl	2015/16		34 854 000	
5th Parl	2016/17		37 005 000	
5th Parl	2017/18		40 185 000	
5th Parl	2018/19		40 753 000	
6th Parl	2019/20		45 047 000	
6th Parl	2020/21		48 620 000	
6th Parl	2021/22		49 913 000	
	Sub-total	Transfers 2009/10 - 2021/22 (13 years to date)		466 053 000
6th Parl	2022/23		50 950 000	
6th Parl	2023/24		53 535 000	
	Sub-total	Transfers 2022/23 - 2023/24 (next 2 years)		104 485 000
	2009/10 - 2023/24	Total transfers 2009/10 - 2023/24 (15 years)		570 538 000
Source: (1) Western Cape Provincial Parliament budget. Programme 4: Members Support. Sub-programme 4.3: Political Parties Support (constituency allowances, secretarial allowances, conditional allowances) - this full sub-programme is listed as transfers to non-profit organisations. (2) WC Provincial Parliament annual reports, list "transfer payments" to political parties.				