While the end of e-tolls is cause for celebration, it also highlights the need for transparency, accountability and good governance in policy decisions. The entire saga has also been a testament to the resilience of civil society and the importance of holding those in power accountable.

The demise of the e-tolling system in Gauteng stands as a testament to the power of collective action and the refusal to accept unjust policies. After a decade of enduring the burdensome e-toll scheme, the recent gazette announcement to turn the scheme off on 11 April 2024 heralds a victory for taxpayers and citizens alike.

The origins of the Gauteng e-toll saga date back to 2008 when a gazette by the South African National Roads Agency Limited (Sanral) quietly declared Gauteng’s congested freeways as tolled roads in preparation for a construction upgrade that would take place between 2008 and 2011.

However, it wasn’t until late in 2010 that the public became fully aware of the government’s plans to introduce an electronic tolling scheme to fund the freeway upgrade, which was initially planned to be switched on in early 2011.

Public surprise and outrage against the e-toll scheme emerged and organisations such as Cosatu and political parties cast doubt on the government’s decision throughout 2011.

The scheme raised the ire of businesses, particularly the fleet industry and other industry bodies, leading in early 2012 to the formation of the civil action organisation known as the Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance (Outa), which later expanded its mandate in 2016 to tackle public sector corruption under its new name, the Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse.

Contrary to government propaganda that sought to deride Outa, the organisation was not opposed to paying for the road upgrade, nor did it oppose the user-pays principle.

Outa’s initial concerns were triggered by the scheme’s high cost relative to existing alternative infrastructure financing mechanisms at the government’s disposal.

The scheme also trampled on government policies pertaining to the freedom of movement and transparency.

As the e-toll scheme approached its final launch date on 30 April 2012, having missed several deadlines throughout 2011, Outa’s research – along with its decision to test the decision in a court review – revealed the scheme was more sinister than initially envisaged and was peppered with corruption concerns, further legitimising its cause and calls to shut it down.

Despite Sanral’s reputation as an efficient state entity prior to 2010, the lack of transparency and gross maladministration pertaining to Gauteng freeway construction collusion became a serious issue for the scheme’s detractors.

What should have been an upgrade costing no more than R7-billion ended up with a price tag of R18-billion. There was no excuse for Sanral to lose control of these costs to this extent.

Claims of construction company collusion and price demand pressures (in the lead-up to the 2010 Soccer World Cup) did not add up.

The initial e-toll tariff indicated by Sanral in 2011 for regular vehicles was R0.60 per kilometre. However, to quell public outrage, Sanral reduced the tariff no less than three times to an eventual launch charge of R0.30 per km. 

This merely fuelled more mistrust in the scheme and the public began to wonder what the government would have done with the extra revenue earned had they simply bowed to Sanral’s plans.

In addition to revelations of a scheme that reeked of corruption and maladministration, the scheme was fraught with cumbersome administrative challenges due to its heavy reliance on the country’s inefficient postal system.

Public resistance was further exacerbated by Sanral’s various threatening and disingenuous campaigns between 2013 and 2019 which warned motorists of high punitive tariffs if they paid late, and that those who refused to pay would face criminal records and would not be allowed to renew their vehicle and drivers’ licences.

Despite these threats, a high percentage of non-compliance became widespread from day one of the launch on 3 December 2013. 

Outa’s intelligence put compliance levels at around 30% on launch day and only a slight increase to 40% within the first six months by June 2014. This was after Sanral publicly stated its confidence in achieving in excess of 90% compliance levels within a few months of launch. 

Outa’s management became incensed by Sanral’s misinformation tactics, which led to the introduction of its multi-pronged strategy to empower citizens with knowledge of the scheme’s flaws and their rights to oppose government policy that was grossly overpriced – especially one bearing the hallmarks of corruption.

As tensions heated up toward the scheme’s launch and beyond, Outa revealed that all Sanral’s enforcement claims were merely coercive tactics with little substance. 

This left Sanral with one option to claim outstanding fees, which was through a very expensive lawfare strategy by summonsing defaulting motorists and businesses, which they embarked on in 2015. 

This in turn led to Outa’s launch of an e-toll defensive campaign which promised to defend thousands of motorists who received a legal summons for nonpayment of their e-toll bills.

A turning point that dealt the ultimate death blow to the e-toll scheme came in March 2019 when, in the lead-up to the May 2019 national and provincial elections, Sanral announced that it no longer intended to pursue civil claims against e-toll defaulters.

This was clearly a decision with a political agenda, as the government realised its lawfare strategy with its citizens was not good for votes. 

As far as Outa was concerned, the beginning of the end for the contentious scheme was in sight, and shortly after Cyril Ramaphosa was elected President in June 2019, he instructed ministers Fikile Mbalula and Tito Mboweni (of transport and finance, respectively) to seek alternative financing methods for the Gauteng freeway upgrade bonds. 

Alarmingly, it took another five years to finally switch the scheme off.

The demise of the e-toll scheme was by no means the result of a willing government decision or the work of the ANC premier of Gauteng. I sincerely believe that no one person or organisation can claim to be the sole reason for the scheme’s closure.

While Outa’s structured litigation, civil disobedience and public empowerment campaign played a significant role, the overall collapse was due to a combination of civil activism and gross overreach by Sanral, whose grandiose plan was shrouded in arrogance and heavy with administrative complexities. 

It was always going to fail in the long run, once the public realised its power and refused to give in to the existence of an abusive government scheme.

While the end of e-tolls is cause for celebration, it also underscores the need for transparency, accountability and good governance in policy decisions.

The entire saga has also been a testament to the resilience of civil society and the importance of holding those in power accountable.

As we move beyond the e-toll saga, I had hoped we would see a fairer, more transparent and responsive government that truly represents the will of the people in the decisions it makes.

However, it appears that lessons have not been heeded from the e-toll debacle, as the government continues to forge ahead with poorly informed complex decisions that lack transparency and are steeped in controversy and excessive costs, such as the Aarto (licence demerit) scheme, National Health Insurance, nuclear energy procurement and other far-reaching decisions being implemented today.